A Gap Analysis Evaluating Project Homekey’s Time-effectiveness in Housing Homeless in Los Angeles

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ABSTRACT

California has been long burdened with the highest rate of homelessness in the United States. However, in recent years, a new housing initiative, Project Homekey, has begun converting city-purchased hotel and motel properties into individual units to temporarily house California’s financially insecure individuals. The nascent program has shown promise, however, due to its recent creation, much of the research surrounding the program focuses on its cost-effectiveness rather than its time-effectiveness in reducing homeless numbers within Los Angeles. Using a gap analysis approach, this study aimed to fill this gap while focusing on 9 recently bought properties within the city of Los Angeles. Publicly accessible city files were used to find and calculate the average rate of stay for Project Homekey inhabitants, and with knowledge of the number of converted units per property as well as the current homeless population – unsheltered and total – within each city council district of Los Angeles, it was estimated how many years it would take to house each city district’s homeless population. Finally, a gap analysis SWOT tool was employed to study the overall soundness of the program in relation to its time effectiveness, and to point out areas of improvement and areas of success. Ultimately, it was concluded that Project Homekey, although estimated to take decades to resolve Los Angeles’s Homeless population, was a viable solution to the arduous issue. Nonetheless, due to the constraint of available resources, there are several limitations as to the extent of the conclusion’s applicability.

Introduction

The homelessness crisis experience is not foreign to Californians. Around 2.5 million low-income households are cost burdened – spending more than thirty percent of their incomes on housing (Petek 2). An additional 1.5 million low-income households are forced to allocate more than half of their income on housing (Petek 2). Residents became increasingly financially insecure as housing rates increased over the years, exceeding growth in wages (Petek 2). The state government, concerned with the vulnerable economy and threatened livelihood of Californians, began prioritizing the complex homelessness crisis.

In efforts to resolve the issue, local leaders called for a reinstatement of the state’s housing first laws, “laws that emphasize permanent housing to people experiencing homelessness without first requiring them to access services or treatment” (Klasky-Gamer and Stokes). Accompanying this reinstatement required the government’s rapid purchasing of real estate to later be converted into housing units. However, in response, some saw this as the homeless motivation to remain unhoused – viewing welfare checks and the guaranteed right to free shelter as an abuse of taxpayer dollars.

Nonetheless, despite controversy, the dire situation called for action. Housing inaccessibility coupled with the economic downturn due to COVID-19 resulted in an influx of the state’s homelessness issue. In response, additional program startups that prioritize the Housing First policy, began to combat the homeless outbreak. Namely, Project Homekey. In an initial response to combat COVID-19 and homelessness, the nationally recognized program has gained traction across the state; Homekey has grown in properties – as motels are increasingly purchased and converted into livable units – and grown in funding – as hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars are spent ensuring individuals are given shelter and covered for rent.
However, as of 2023, neighborhoods continue to deal with encampments filled with drug-ridden individuals as large sums of taxpayer dollars were thrown at the issue. As a result, Californians could not help but become frustrated with the issue. While this study is not focused on the controversy regarding the public’s feedback on Project Homekey, the lack of improvement seen in cities calls for an evaluation of Project Homekey’s capabilities. Due to its recent implementation, there is a lack of unbiased research surrounding the housing initiative. Thus, this research focuses on the gap regarding Project Homekey’s significance by measuring the programs time-effectiveness in reducing homelessness numbers – both the unsheltered population and total population. To achieve such information, the research assesses the topic through a gap analysis approach. Specifically, the study focuses on nine recently converted motel properties in Los Angeles County, measuring the projected number of years it will take to reduce the homeless population in each council district that the properties are located in. As part of the gap analysis, the findings will then be aligned with government publications regarding the city’s objectives for Project Homekey and identifying whether the program was able to satisfy such goals given adequate time and funding.

**Literature Review**

To understand the motivations behind this study’s focus on assessing Project Homekey’s success in combating Los Angeles, California’s homeless rate, it was essential to review the existing body of knowledge. Based on a synthesis of research, two main areas were expanded on: the context of the current housing climate, and the efforts local government had made to combat homelessness with the implementation of Project Homekey. Additionally, this review will demonstrate where this study will extend the existing knowledge of the value of a highly funded affordable housing initiative.

**Understanding California’s Homeless Climate**

Despite its efforts to be proactive in housing its residents, California has seemed to find minimal success in alleviating their homeless issue. In fact, the situation has often been coined a crisis as thousands of Californians experience “environmental and socioeconomic disparities” that have been exacerbated by “unaffordability, insufficient housing, and destructive urban sprawl” (Wilson 628-629). Wilson states how such consequences have been enabled by “restrictive local government regulations that make it difficult to build housing in the dense, job-rich areas where it is needed most” (629). Various reports testify to the severity of the problem. In the 2020 Annual Homelessness Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress, published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, over 160,000 Californians were experiencing homelessness, with seventy-two percent doing so outdoors (Henry et al. 14). In addition, it was also reported that more than half of California residents could not afford housing in 2020. In comparison to the AHAR released for the year 2022, the estimate number of people experiencing homelessness in California rose by about ten thousand, while the percentage of those unsheltered lowered by three (Henry et al. 18). Fluctuations between homelessness have occurred over the years, however one continuity has persisted: California well surpasses the homeless rates of any other state in the country. In response, the state’s government officials devoted tax money into possible remedies. Between fiscal years 2018-19 and 2020-21, funding of $9.6 billion was directed towards thirty-five homelessness-focused programs (California Interagency on Homelessness 26).

In 2020, with the COVID-19 pandemic, housing efforts were both hindered and accelerated. While many families lost steady sources of income and large amounts of the state’s budget went towards welfare checks, the pandemic also led to an expansion of resources to protect people from experiencing homelessness and reduce the spread of COVID-19 – this includes the start of Project Homekey.
Origins: Roomkey to Homekey

According to the Full Report Statewide Homelessness Assessment, the state dedicated $100 million in emergency funding to local governments to shelter the homeless during the spread of the pandemic in 2020 (California Interagency on Homelessness 26). As mentioned previously, Project Homekey is a recent housing initiative to house homeless individuals in California. Established in March of 2020, its predecessor, Project Roomkey, responded to the COVID-19 pandemic and provided “non-congregate shelter options” by converting hotels and motels into individual affordable housing units (“Homelessness COVID Response”). In November 2020, the project took up a second phase of rehousing strategies; still, the priority was building on existing shelter to provide emergency safe, and stable housing for the financially underprivileged to quarantine. Project Roomkey units were a temporary option while its counterpart, the Rehousing Strategy, helped occupants transition individuals into permanent housing sites, leaving no resident behind. On August 25, 2022, Project Roomkey received notice of foreclosure. Meanwhile, the Project Homekey grant program continued on the mission as it created long-term homes post-pandemic for those subject to homelessness. According to California Department of Social Services, Homekey is able to create living units by converting “commercial properties and other existing buildings to permanent or interim housing”, oftentimes including hotels and motels (“Homelessness COVID Response”).

Project Homekey in Recent Years

Project Homekey has progressed significantly over the past three years. In 2020, Homekey “Round 1” provided the County with 10 motels, with a total of 847 units. The program adopted the ‘Housing First’ concept in which people should be in stable housing before addressing other needs – ranging from substance abuse, to financial issues, to unemployment (Times Editorial Board). Thus, to keep up with large numbers of incoming applicants, in 2022, Governor Gavin Newsom dedicated $330 million in Homekey grants for Los Angeles County (Haire). The year 2022 also marked Homekey’s second round in which the state secured 14 hotels and multi-family apartments – in other words, an additional 720 units for interim or permanent housing. As of March 2023, the Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) was released for the current, and third phase of Homekey.

Varying Perspectives

Proponents argue that project Homekey is a practical approach to solving the homeless crisis. Motel and hotel properties, already suitable for living conditions, reduce construction time and costs, and can be sold back if the property is no longer needed. In addition, the entirety of the funding burden does not fall on the state government. Public entities, non-profits, and for-profit organizations can apply for state funds to purchase and start up a Homekey property (Smith). Considering the imminent crisis of COVID-19, taking this approach to respond was proactive and most promising.

However, despite the abundance in funding and additional units per phase, between years 2019 to 2022, the population of unhoused people in the state continued to increase, thus bringing into question the project’s ability to eradicate homelessness (Times Editorial Board; Henry et al. 18). Amongst the many who are wary of taxpayer money being largely allocated to seemingly ineffective programs, are Kerry Jackson and Wayne Winegarden from the Pacific Research Institute. In their published report, they note how despite the program’s ability to move people into shelter, the costs are excessive (10). The city has hardly met up with their promises in addition to exacerbating funding issues; come June 2021, only 1,794 of the rooms were occupied regardless of being promised 15,000 (Jackson and Winegarden 5). Furthermore, opponents of the Homekey funding argue that this approach turns into an endless cycle of homelessness, funding, and more homelessness; just as quickly as units are filled, more people are subject to homelessness – often times through economic evictions, due to the unaffordability of rent increases (Stuart). Due to fundamental issues in affordable housing, the homelessness crisis is affecting everyone as it grows in complexity, making it more difficult...
to address. Despite a 28.8 percent increase in the economy between the years 2014 and 2020, the homeless crisis continued to worsen (Jackson and Winegarden 9). It is possible that money, time, and effort is not what is lacking, nor is the extent of various initiatives, but rather, the most effective approach may be legislation-based.

**Research Gap**

Alleviating this large of a homeless population is a timely process, however, with the state dedicating up to billions in funding, the public has grown anxious to see rapid improvement. Specifically, conflict has arisen between those in favor of Project Homekey efforts, those in total opposition of Project Homekey, and those who propose reduced Homekey fundings with an emphasis instead on legislative action. Often the research regarding these various perspectives are heavily accompanied with bias, especially since there is a lack of research to refer to regarding Homekey’s efforts to make a direct, sizable impact on the state’s homeless population. To address such concerns, this study focused on nine recently converted Project Homekey sites in Los Angeles County and addresses the research question: does Project Homekey reduce homeless numbers in Los Angeles, California in a time-effective manner?

**Methodology**

To discover the program’s effectiveness, this study aimed to measure the difference between the current state of the organization, and the organization’s intended state. To answer the research question, a gap analysis study was implemented using secondary quantitative data.

**Gap Analysis**

The preferred methodology to assess Project Homekey’s efficiency in solving Los Angeles’s homelessness crisis was a gap analysis approach. This is an analytical tool that measures the difference between the current state and potential state of an organization – this difference is referred to as the gap (Chevalier 5). The methodology’s framework calculates what strategies can be implemented to maximize potential, reach objectives, and, hopefully, close the gap (Van Auken 347). This model is mainly suitable for businesses and organizations who require problem-solving insight (Rueda 71). The structure of a gap study is preferred to assess Project Homekey’s effect on Los Angeles as it is designed to improve performance and achieve organizational goals. The approach can clarify short-term and long-term goals at both an organizational or individual level, assess them, and describe the gaps between the current state and the achievement to the desired state (Rueda 73). Due to the lack of research regarding Project Homekey’s time effectiveness has inspired the gap of this study to be centered around the organization’s ability to align with its objectives to house Los Angeles County’s homeless population.

**Study Parameters**

Gap analysis approaches are often dynamic with various variables, gaps, and purposes (Juan and Ou-Yang 1325). However, for the concentration of this study, it was most effective to narrow parameters. Therefore, the study encompasses only the nine new properties built in Los Angeles County. It relates the available units per property, the rate of stay, and the council districts’ current homeless population – sheltered and unsheltered – to find the projected number of years it will take to fully house all individuals. By focusing the study on the nine new properties and Los Angeles County, the research conclusions can be most accurate, applicable, and relevant. If the study were to expand the scope, it would further threaten the evaluation of the program as other homeless climates and housing initiatives would become a conflict.
Data Collection

Most of the data sets used were obtained through quantitative sheets of statistics publicly released via city clerk files. Under Motion CF 20-0045, the Chief Legislative Analyst (CLA), City Attorney, City Administrative Officer (CAO), the Housing and Community Investment Department (HCID), and the Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA) were instructed to evaluate the “LAHSA governing structure and assess other models for the delivery of homeless services” (Tso 1). This document, along with previously published legislative reports, was used to undertake the first step of the gap analysis: defining a goal (Mercadal). This general objective would later be referenced throughout the study evaluation to see if results aligned with the LAHSA plan.

Additionally, under council file 21-0112, a report from the Los Angeles Housing Department was published to outline specific data regarding the nine projects under the State of California Housing and Community Development Department’s Homekey Program (Swede and Swoger 4). Listed was the number of units to be converted into interim affordable housing units following the acquisition of the nine properties. Covering the data for the homeless population variable, LAHSA released countywide information that detailed the number of homeless people per council district within Los Angeles County (“2022 Greater Los Angeles Homeless Count Data”).

Data Analysis

There are three general stages – following the first step to identify the organization’s objective – to develop a gap analysis: actual state, future state, and needs and solutions (Mercadal). The actual stage encompasses the current state of the organization and identifies the gap, or weaknesses, that need to be resolved. Although the gap to be analyzed was Project Homekey’s time efficiency, the “actual state” was set to be the current homeless count (see Appendix 2) in each council district that the new Homekey properties were in – if a council district was not participating in any of the newly converted nine Homekey sites, it was disregarded from the study.

The future state identifies the goal, or potential, visualized for the organization. An essential part of this stage was the findings regarding Homekey’s projected number of years to resolve each council district’s homeless crisis.

To calculate the futures state’s projections, various formulas needed to be utilized. First, the Project Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) formula was calculated to find the weighted average rate of stay for Homekey residents; this weighted rate would later be inputted into a separate formula. The formula accounts for multiple variables and scenarios: optimistic time estimate (A), realistic time estimate (B), and pessimistic time (C) estimate. The PERT formula takes the weighted average and gives 4 times as much weight to the most likely, or B, estimate. The data was inputted into a Graphing TI-84 calculator. Figure 1, below, shows the formula to calculate the weighted average rate of an applicant’s stay.

The optimistic value (A) was five years, the realistic value (B) was ten years, and the pessimistic value (C) was fifteen years. Such values were found in various reports that were released by the state’s Department of Housing and Community Development (Swede and Stoger 47-62).

\[
\frac{[((A)(1)] + [(4)(B)] + [(C)(1)]}{6}
\]

Figure 1. Weighted Average Rate Formula

The weighted average rate was then input into a compounded continuously formula via Graphing TI-84 Calculator. The formula was calculated twice per property, with each council district’s sheltered and total homeless population. Figure 2, below, shows the compounded continuously formula. The final amount (A) is set equal to the principle (P), or original amount, and is raised by the rate of interest (r) multiplied by the time (t). For the purposes of this study, the time value was unknown to calculate the projected number of years to house each council district’s homeless population (inputted A value) given the number of units per property (inputted P value) (Simmons).
\[ A = Pe^{rt} \]

**Figure 2. Compounded Continuously Formula**

To address the final stage of the gap analysis, the needs and solutions, a general construction of a Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) tool was employed. The information that the SWOT analysis consisted of were general commentary points specifically regarding the data available in city file 21-0112 and the findings from the compounded continuously calculations. This chart is an assessment technique that “organizes information, identity issues, determine solutions, and suggests opportunities” (Harmon). It highlights the external and internal strengths and weaknesses. To address the needs state, it organizes both the assumed elements and threats that cause the gap, and the opportunities that can be exploited to solve it. Figure 3, below, models a SWOT chart. The SWOT tool and the final stage of the gap analysis work in conjunction to bridge the actual and ideal state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong> (internal, positive)</td>
<td><strong>Strengths-Threats Strategy:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength-Opportunity Strategy:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weaknesses</strong> (internal, negative)</td>
<td><strong>Weakness-Threats Strategy:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakness-Opportunity Strategy:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3. SWOT Organization Chart Template**

Finally, using the results provided by the three stages of the gap analysis – actual state assessing Homekey objectives, future state employing compounded continuously formula, and needs assessment using SWOT organization tool – the research question can be answered regarding the project’s ability to effectively reduce homelessness in Los Angeles.

**Results**

This study addresses the gap in the literature by providing research regarding Project Homekey’s time effectiveness by calculating the projected number of years it would take to house each council district’s homeless population. Below are the findings after calculating the data using a continuously compounding formula and assembling the general results in a SWOT organization chart. The figures are presented in order of the gap analysis process: beginning with a calculation of the weighted average rate of residents’ stay and ending with the generalized SWOT chart.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pessimistic Value</th>
<th>Optimistic Value</th>
<th>Most Probable Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 years</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted Average Rate:</td>
<td>10.0 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4. Calculation of the Weighted Average Rate of Applicant’s Stay – Applicable to All 9 Properties (see fig. 1 for formula reference)**

The results of the continuous compounding formula (see fig. 2) targeted at calculating the rate each property can house its council district’s unsheltered homeless population is shown in Figure 5. Figure 6 shows the results of the same formula, however, in relation to its council district’s total homeless population – sheltered and unsheltered.
Figure 5. Results of Compounded Continuously Formula – Unsheltered Population (See Appendix 1 and 2).

Figure 6. Results of Compounded Continuously Formula – Total (Unsheltered and Sheltered) Population. (See Appendix 1 and 2)

It should be noted that the findings for properties 6 and 9 have lower projected numbers because they belong to the same Council District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(external, positive)</td>
<td>(external, negative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strength-Threats Strategy:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(internal, positive)</td>
<td>80% of the 9 properties are perma-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
<td>nently funded, reduces threat of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opportunity Strategy:</strong></td>
<td>foreclosure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximize outreach programs for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residents to shift weighted average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rate of stay towards optimistic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>value.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weaknesses</strong></td>
<td><strong>Weakness-Threats Strategy:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(internal, negative)</td>
<td>As sizable progression is made,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weaknesses</strong></td>
<td>increase applicants’ demonstration of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opportunity Strategy:</strong></td>
<td>yearly rent to linearize property’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carefully use opportunity of surplus</td>
<td>s profit and resident’s stay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in funding to allow residents to stay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debt free. In turn, lowers rate of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stay.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Figure 7. General SWOT Organization Chart
**Evaluation**

According to a news release published by California Governor Gavin Newsom, one billion dollars in homelessness funding was announced with the aim of reducing the state’s homelessness crisis by fifteen percent by the year 2025 ("$1 Billion in Homelessness Funding"). In relation to the findings from the data input into the continuously compounded formula, Project Homekey’s efforts alone are not an adequate solution to solve the council district’s homeless issues. Even the outlier, two properties in Council District 3, will require around twelve years to resolve its unsheltered homeless population. This was surprising as the rate input into the compounded continuously formula was weighed mainly on the most probably estimate of stay. In consideration of both the findings and Governor Newsom’s expectations, it is evident that not even the overwhelm of taxpayer money collected can achieve the goal of a fifteen percent reduction in homelessness.

**Actual State**

Assessing the actual state is vital to understand the current, and possibly initial, condition Los Angeles County is experiencing in their path to housing the homeless. The study focused on eight of the fifteen council districts in California since two of the nine new properties were located in the same district. Furthermore, as part of stage 3, a large sum of in funding sources was disbursed for Homekey projects. Los Angeles County received $212.9 million of this sum – a breakdown of the amount of funding allocated per property is included (see Appendix 3). The actual state found that the County consists of a sizable homeless population, however, each council district was given tens of millions of dollars to address the issue. For the Homekey sites, eighty percent of the units for each of the nine sites will have project-based voucher, meaning the rent for those units will be paid for, for the duration of the project. Coupled with government funding, some sites, under NOFA Section 303, required applicants to demonstrate a full five years of operating funds. Therefore, the current, or actual state, appeared manageable given the surplus in funding, the amount of new housing units, and the rent contribution of residents, despite a substantial homeless count.

**Future State**

The intended future state of the project needed to see sizable decrease in homeless population – fifteen percent or more – by 2025, as announced by Governor Newsom. As discovered by the calculations, it was clear that the year disparity was a big gap for Project Homekey in Los Angeles County. Considering the project began around 2020, it would take well more than five years to resolve the issue. In fact, according to the findings, some council districts would need multiple decades.

**Needs Assessment**

The general SWOT organization tool provided approaches to the four distinct areas within the gap of Project Homekey. The SWOT tool strictly drew conclusions from the findings from the actual state and the compounded continuously formula (future state assessment tool) to ensure that the strategies provided reflected the previous mentioned data and addressed the initially identified gap. Without constricting the SWOT strategies to reflect the actual and future state data, the strategies would have been susceptible to bias as it would have drawn on outside sources. The compounded continuously formula (used for the futures state step) provided quantitative data that could then be interpreted by comparing the projection years to the actual state, and from there could be broken down into the four strategies of improvement. It was critical to set parameters for the SWOT tool to remain relevant and specific to the posed research question.
The Strength-Opportunity strategy addressed what strengths can be manipulated to maximize identified opportunities, the Strengths-Threats strategy focused on Homekey’s strengths used to minimize threats, the Weakness-Opportunity strategy provided possible actions to minimize the company’s weaknesses using the opportunities, and finally, the Weakness-Threats strategy regarded how the organization could minimize the weaknesses to avoid possible threats (Shewan). The needs assessment within this gap analysis was outlined to be general due to the study’s limitations – in this situation, the ambiguity of the SWOT analysis tool allowed the proposed strategies to be more applicable to the actual state. The Strength-Opportunity strategy focused on the opportunities provided by outreach financial programs, such as the Rehousing Strategy, for residents to utilize with the intention to shift the weighted average rate of stay towards optimistic value. Likewise, the Weakness-Opportunity strategy emphasizes a similar idea of maximizing residents’ financial assistance to lower the rate of stay as a result of being debt free. The other continuity lies within the Strength-Threats strategy and the Weakness-Threats Strategy; both promote the manipulation of allocated funds to prolong the operation of the Homekey property and linearize the property’s profit with a resident’s stay.

Conclusion

In response to the question, “Does Project Homekey reduce homeless numbers in Los Angeles, California in a time-effective manner?” this study’s results indicate that the program does not. The results of this study can, and should, be considered amongst other sources to inform policy makers how to maximize the state budget to minimize the homeless count. However, the results applicability varies depending on the context, thus it is important to clarify the study’s limitations and implications.

One notable limitation is the parameters of the study. For reasons of feasibility, accuracy, and staying specific to the gap, set parameters were in place: for example, the study focused on Project Homekey alone rather than the program coupled with other housing initiatives in Los Angeles County. Thus, while the conclusion that Project Homekey alone cannot meet the Governor’s goals, the same can not be said about if the state will see a fifteen percent reduction in homelessness by 2025 as a result of all housing initiatives. Studying Homekey alongside other projects would create a realistic representation of the housing efforts within Los Angeles County. Further research is recommended that expands such parameters to estimate when Los Angeles County will see a reduction in its homeless population due to multiple sheltering efforts. Even further, in a comparative modification of a gap analysis, one can use the research provided from this study and compare it to an assessment of another program to study where state funds are more likely to see maximum value.

Another limitation is the precision in the average weighted rate of applicants stay. The pessimistic, optimistic, and probable values that were input into the PERT formula – and later into the compounded continuously formula – were found by reviewing various city files. However, to receive the most accurate rate, it would be useful to conduct a separate primary study as opposed to relying on the current literature and documentation surrounding the project. For example, a study could measure multiple previously instituted Homekey sites and measure the average years each resident inhabits a room. Then this data could be input into the compounded continuously formula, however, now with a more precise rate of stay.

The final notable limitation is the that the study did not conduct separate calculations using solely an optimistic, or pessimistic, rate. This decision was made because by calculating with an extreme rate, it would disregard the possibility of residents who need to lengthen or shorten their stay. Additionally, this study did not conduct additional calculations for any value less than the optimistic value because according to the Department of Housing and Community Development and Section 303 in the Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA), “the applicant will need to demonstrate a full 5 years of operating funds” (Homekey Frequently Asked Questions 7). In the same manner, no calculations included a rate that weighed a value larger than the pessimistic stay.

Nonetheless, despite these study limitations, the study is still applicable to help bridge the gap of research in the current body of knowledge. The findings alongside an understanding of the program’s origins, demonstrate that
while the project is a feasible, and cost-considerate solution, the ratio of rooms to homeless individuals is too large to make a sizable difference by 2025.

Much scrutiny can be raised regarding Project Homekey’s choice of methods to address the crisis. For instance, Enterprise Community partners question the project’s environmental approach; specifically raising concerns regarding zoning from motel to residential, whether CEQA (environmental) studies should be required to address the change in building usage, and how to control the current expensive costs of operating the facilities (“Assessing Early Homekey Progress in Los Angeles”). Other economists argue that the program bolsters for-profit companies (Smith). Perhaps it is not the money, time, and effort that is lacking, or the performance of Homekey, but rather, the legislation and Housing First policies California has chosen to approach the crisis with.

Despite motivations, which can be a further area of research to expand, it is evident that Homekey works to resolve the issue of homelessness, however, in a lengthy period. Legislation, funding other initiatives, or more, are other solutions to take further action alongside Project Homekey’s efforts. While there may not be a definitive answer to Los Angeles County’s homelessness crisis, focusing on programs that need reassessment provides deeper insight into the initiatives that truly make a sizable difference.

Works Cited


