Yugo Wars: A Case Study on the Peacekeeping Efforts in Bosna-Hercegovina

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ABSTRACT

This article is an examination of the history of ex-Yugoslav, more specifically the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and its immediate neighbors. A brief history of imperialism, religious influence, and the impact of the World Wars within BiH will lead to a discussion on nationalist-separatism and Balkan independence movements. The article focuses on the drive behind, and the outcome of, the 1992 war within BiH that stemmed from BiH’s desire to be independent from Yugoslavia. The primary perspectives within the article are that of the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Outside actors such as Serbia, Russia, the United States, Pakistan, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Muslim terrorist organizations, the United Nations (UN), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will also be discussed to capture the various stakes and goals of the war. This will transition into a detailed breakdown of various UN and NATO missions, as well as their impact on the citizens and factions within BiH. The missions analyzed within this article will be the Dayton Peace Accords, the United Nations Mission in BiH (UNMIBH), the Stabilization Force (SFOR), the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Implementation Force (IFOR), and the European Union Force (EUFOR). Transparency in BiH between parties to the conflict, the success or failure of peace enforcement, and the provision of effective rehabilitation assistance by the international community will be put into question. The article’s conclusion will analyze the value of peacekeeping within BiH as well as address the lasting social/emotional impact on the BiH community.

Contextualization: Imperialism, World Wars, and Nationalism

Two powerful Slavic tribes, the Croats and Serbs, settled into what is now Southeastern Europe in the 7th century. The creation of the current ethnicities within Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) occurred in the 1380s, when the Ottomans conquered these two Slavic tribes (Malcolm, Pickering, Paula, Lampe, John, 2022). Ottomans raided Serbia and migrated westward until they captured Sarajevo, a major city and currently BiH’s capitol, in 1448 (NGK, 2021). Ottomans used Sarajevo as a base to conquer the rest of Bosnia proper in a 20-year timespan. Although parts of Herzegovina and Northern Bosnia were conquered by Hungary, the entire region eventually fell to the Turks in 1482. Ottomans imposed an overwhelming amount of taxes on non-Muslims during their rule and implemented a system called devşirme, where Christian boys over 10 years old were taken to train in the imperial administration, never to be seen again. Muslims also had a privileged legal status, could avoid taxes and military service, and generally led a fuller life. Unlike the nationalized, strong Orthodox churches Serbia had, Bosnia struggled with competing Orthodox [Serbian] and Roman Catholic [Croatian] churches (Malcolm, Pickering, Paula, Lampe, John, 2022). With no nationalized religion, Christianity was structurally weaker in BiH, which ultimately led Bosnia to surrender to the Turks and convert to Islam.

In 1877, however, BiH was fought over and slowly conquered by Austro-Hungary (NGK, 2021). The Austro-Hungarian empire initiated successful public works projects in BiH. Due to them, BiH had well-developed infrastructure in the forms of railways, road networks, about 200 primary schools, etc. by 1907 (Malcolm, Pickering, Paula, Lampe, John, 2022). However, Austro-Hungary failed to cultivate a national consciousness that would have kept BiH from creating nationalist-separatist movements. Roman Catholic and Orthodox peoples began identifying as “Croats”
and “Serbs” respectively by the 1800s (Malcolm, Pickering, Paula, Lampe, John, 2022). Muslims, a new people, and a by-product of Ottoman rule, began campaigning for nationalized Islamic institutions. By 1908, the sudden announcement of BiH’s annexation by Austro-Hungary would anger Yugoslavs (i.e. “South Slavs”), especially Serbian nationalists. The idea of liberating the region from imperialism led to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, by Gavrilo Princip – a Bosnian Serb who was connected to a radical group called the Black Hand (BBC, 2022). Prior to WWI, Yugoslavs were only officially represented in two independent kingdoms, Serbia and Montenegro. For the Yugoslavs controlled within Austria-Hungary, a Yugoslav Committee was established to create a “Yugoslav state.” After WWI, the collapse of Austria-Hungary left BiH and other territories in the hands of Serbia (NGK, 2021). By 1918, the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia” was established.

World War II was a pivotal moment for BiH. Despite an early declaration of neutrality, Yugoslavia would sign the Tripartite Pact, forming an alliance with Axis powers (Britannica, September 2022). Yugoslavia was then divided into various puppet states, with each region being either under German or Italian military control. The area was devastated in part by the displacement of thousands and by the Serbs, Jews, etc. sent to concentration camps (BBC, 2022). Croats cooperated with the Axis powers in their territory (Woyach, October 28), while Serbs rejected Axis occupation and pushed for resistance movements set up by the Serbo-Yugoslav army, the Četniks, or the communist Partizani. This communist group would eventually lead the reconstitution of Yugoslavia from a kingdom into a federation reigned over by Josip Broz “Tito.” The six republics – Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia – were then united and collectively referred to as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Generally, Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox citizens lived together peacefully. However, it is important to note that political and religious censorship was enforced by the government. During Tito’s rule, any person holding a government job (i.e. a company employee, professor, diplomat, etc.) could not practice their religion or would otherwise face intense punishment (Va. Lucic, 2022). There was a major focus on the suppression of identity rather than celebrating differences under Tito, but this issue was sidelined as the government created one of the most successful communist regimes in history (Woyach, October 28). However, the 1980s suffered from a sharp economic decline, with low exports and few jobs, which led to widespread public dissatisfaction and an increase in separatist thought. Moreover, Muslims increasingly voiced their desire to develop a “distinct nation.” During this Islamic-nationalist push, a massive forced emigration of Serbs and Croats took place (Lampe, 2022). After Tito’s death in 1980, the people of Yugoslavia would spiral into chaos. People who were forced to repress their opinions, religions, and identities due to imperialism, world wars, and now communist dictatorship had finally snapped. Militaristic battles began over territory and independence (Popovski, 2017, 127). Milošević [successor of Tito] soon threatened the republics with the idea of political and economic centralization in Belgrade. His efforts were met with distaste. As elections throughout the republics took place all republics, save for Serbia, suffered communist defeat. In early 1990, multiparty elections were held in regions such as Croatia, where they ultimately gained independence from Yugoslavia (Lampe, 2022). Slovenia declared independence after a 1990 referendum and Croatia after a 1991 referendum (Office of The Historian, 2022). After seeing this fragmentation of Yugoslavia, and after being influenced by the European Community (EC, later known as the European Union) to apply for their own recognition, a majority of the BiH peoples voted for independence in a 1992 referendum (Malcolm, Pickering, Paula, Lampe, John, 2022).

Tensions escalated after the 1992 referendum on the independence of BiH, which was the most ethnically mixed region of Yugoslavia. Conflict bred out of the fear. No one wanted to be a minority in a territory governed by another ethno-national group. Croat and Muslim nationalists formed an alliance to outvote Serbs during this referendum, to which Serbs responded by immediately seizing over half of the land (BBC, 2022). Ethnic tensions and nationality were brought to the forefront as people who were once neighbors turned against and killed each other (Holocaust Museum Houston, 2022). The possibility of partitioning BiH was discussed during talks between the Croatian and Serbian presidents, but Serbs, who controlled about 70 percent of the land, refused to concede any territory. In general, all parties feared becoming a minority, and all parties were afraid of the rampant ethnic cleansing that occurred by and against every faction (Lucic Va, 2022; Lucic Ve, 2022). When BiH’s independence was officially
internationally recognized in January 1992, Serb paramilitary forces immediately fired on Sarajevo. Artillery bombardments by Serb units in the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) soon followed (Lampe, 2022). General ethnic cleansing campaigns from 1992-1995 killed thousands and displaced over two million people BiH (Holocaust Museum Houston, 2022). International commitment to the conflict, as is later discussed, was successful in ending the war, but was otherwise a train wreck.

**Parties to the Conflict**

**Bosnian Serbs**

The Bosnian Serbs (Serbs) were heavily concerned about their overall supremacy and influence over the territory. They hoped to remain in Yugoslavia in order to keep a close union with Serbia and refrain from becoming a BiH minority, which was the main catalyst of fight for this secession. By 1991, Muslims were a bit more than 40% of the population, but Serbs were around 33% of the population (Brittanica, April 2022) – hence the Serbs’ interest to remain a part of Yugoslavia, which was at this point more-or-less a Serbian-majority nation. Furthermore, the YPA, which was dominated by Serbs, appointed BiH to be the heart of military industry (Noel, 2002) due to its central geographic position within Yugoslavia. The YPA used BiH as an armament storehouse and military production site, and the Bosnian Serb forces, who were aided by the YPA, commandeered most this weaponry. Should BiH secede, what would happen with this Serb-dominated artillery remained unclear. This large concentration of arms also meant it was a significant resource for arms trade, which was a main driver of Eastern European economy (Woyach, November 30). Thus, the Serbs rejected the referendum, and a war for secession began.

**Bosniaks**

The Bosnian Muslims, also known in BiH as “Bosniaks” or “Muslims,” were intent on achieving independence from Yugoslavia due to differences in religion, but more importantly due to their hope to create an independent, Islamic state (Ve. Lucic, 2022). Bosniaks were equally, extremely committed the goal of independence as Serbs were in their goal to stop BiH’s independence. For Bosniaks, no retreat to other countries was possible. Their existence in the region was fairly new due to them being by-products of Ottoman rule. Their Muslim beliefs were also nationalized through Bosnian patriotism, so the idea of moving to regions like Kosovo were not seen as a feasible alternative (Ve. Lucic, 2022). Thus, the group had most to gain and the most to lose, considering their loss would result in a minority status in an increasingly Orthodox Yugoslavia. Due to limited military resources, which will be discussed later, Bosniaks were limited to the defense within their own territory. However, they would soon be aided by various Islamic terrorist groups, such as the mujahadeen and al-Qaeda (Ve. Lucic). Characterizing this as a religious war would be fallacious. Although, some initial atrocities involved abuses of religious symbols, none of the actors were religious fanatics (Szasz, 691). Religion was most certainly a function of violence in civil society (Woyach, October 28), but primary fears/hatreds were fueled by recent ethno-nationalist conflicts stemming from past imperialism.

**Bosnian Croats**

The Bosnian Croats (Croats), which were roughly 16% of BiH’s population, wanted independence from Yugoslavia due to their difference in religion [being Roman Catholic] and their nationalist ties to Croatia. Bosnian Croats from Western Herzegovina were especially eager to either join the new Croatian state, restore pre-Ottoman Croatia, or create their own officially recognized republic within BiH, Herzeg-Bosna (*Encyclopedia, 2022*). The Bosnian Croats were committed to fight for independence because they were actively displaced and pushed southward by both Muslims and Serbs since the beginning of the conflict (Ve. Lucic, 2022). However, Croats and Bosniaks initially shared
the same enemy: Bosnian Serbs (Ve. Lucic, 2022). A Muslim-Croat coalition led to a joint federation in 1994 (Lampe, 2022). Although power and influence were important to them, Croats were not concerned about total supremacy. Their commitment to the war was not based off expanding into BiH, but rather purely to survive. The main reason Bosnian Croats ushered Croatia to intervene was to seize territories inhabited by Bosnian Croatian minorities and protect the civilians within those regions (Office of The Historian, 2022).

**Outside Intervention and the Extent of Involvement**

Considering the fact that there were a multitude of countries, factions, and side actors in this conflict, the essay will focus on more pivotal foreign interventions and the most impactful contributors to the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. To the extent of the research gathered, those are the following: Serbia, Russia, the US, Pakistan, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Muslim terrorist organizations, the UN, and NATO.

Serbia’s involvement has been consistently pro-Serb and anti-Bosniak since the beginning of the conflict. From the time of Ottoman rule to now, Serb officials commonly refused to recognize the existence of a Bosnian Muslim nationality (Khan, 298). This rejection of nationality coupled with Serbia’s alleged “hatred for their fellow Slavic Muslims” (Khan, 288) would later justify various ethnic cleansing practices that Serbia would be instrumental in performing against Bosniaks. As previously noted, Yugoslavia (aka, Serbia) also aided Bosnian Serbs with the stockpiled YPA weaponry in Sarajevo in an attempt to overpower Bosniaks. During the dissolution process of Yugoslavia, the Security Council (SC) held the new Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) responsible for the outbreak of hostilities in BiH and for supporting Bosnian Serb forces. This led to an arms embargo and restrictions on diplomatic and communication activities (Szasz, 688). The SC was responsible for monitoring this resolution. However, the UN Resolution 713 arms embargo was plotted by Serbia (Sells, 117), and in the end hugely advantaged the Bosnian Serbs, who did not worry about the arms embargo, considering they had immediate access to the YPA munitions and weapons – whereas the Croats and Bosniaks would need to shuffle their feet to find a loophole. Serbia will play an immense role throughout the conflict, especially due to its understanding of the international impact of the Cold War.

The context of the Cold War is important to note when discussing the US’s and Russia’s involvement in BiH. During the Cold War, Yugoslavia was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. This decision was made in 1955 to avoid opting for one military-political bloc over the other (The Non-Aligned Movement, 2022). This effort preserved global peace, calmed competition between blocs, and was a way to express independence from the “spheres of influence” created after WWII (Prashad 2007, 95). After the Cold War settled, the world moved from Russian and the US’s bipolarity towards the US’s unipolar moment. Less global repression as a result of this war meant more civil conflict, especially after 1992, which saw an exponential demand for peacekeeping (Woyach, September 23). BiH is located at the crossroads of the capitalist West and communist East, and its war erupted just after the collapse of many East European communist regimes. There was consensus among Western allies to solve the conflict, and the opportunity for outside intervention existed, but no one was eager to engage in activity that could lead to military confrontation. In simpler terms: they should have and could have, but they did not want to get involved. Around 40% of BiH is forest, and around half of the total land in BiH is used to raise livestock or grow crops (NGK, 2021). There were no diamonds or gold to give outside actors an incentive to interfere with the conflict. The lack of incentive delayed reaction. However, due to difficulties in delivering humanitarian aid and grotesque human rights violations, nations were forced to act.

Russia’s involvement in this conflict is more complex than meets the eye. A traditional alliance with Serbia was expected due to shared Slavic and Christian Orthodox heritage. However, in 1992 Russia recognized the independence of BiH. This might have been affected by the outcome of the Cold War, a chance in the leadership’s political leanings, or it might have been to keep BiH divided and dysfunctional to prevent the development of its foreign policy and its inclusion into NATO (Ruge, 2022). Interestingly, Russia worked with UNPROFOR in 1993 to establish “safe areas” throughout Bosnia to protect the Muslims (Hillen III, 1995, 4). Russia not only worked with NATO and the UN, but also contributed large amounts of troops to NATO-led stabilization forces, which was a spectacle when
considering NATO was created was to defend against Russia. This was seen as a huge improvement in the West-Russian relationship. Russia also sided with the West in the vote for sanctions on Serbia, but most measures amounted to a “Western policy of appeasement” (Ruge, 2022). However, ideologically, Moscow still backed Belgrade, and an estimated 500 Russian volunteers fought with the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units during the war. President Yeltsin also often criticized NATO’s role in BiH, claiming they should keep out of his “backyard” (Sattar & Liu, 1996, 51). All in all, the situation with Russia is complex. However, Russia did play a role in the de-escalation of conflict and peace enforcement within the Balkan region.

The US’s response to the war was also not what had been expected by most parties. The immediate reaction of the Bush administration was to play down or cover-up genocide reports (Khan, 301) and deny the US possessed any knowledge of ethnic cleansing. Later on, Clinton was hesitant to engage in BiH, until he began airstrikes like NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force out of the fear that ongoing conflict in BiH could impact US interests (Khan, 316). Generally, the US never took on a role in providing peacekeeping troops to war-torn regions until the BiH conflict (Woyach, October 7), but instead provided logistical support. This shows the complexity between the US’s unwillingness to get involved, but also their understanding that ongoing massacres and violence in the Balkans could not go uninterrupted. Internationally, groups were quick to accuse the US of not being active enough due to a lack of incentive (Khan, 288). Some argued, “[T]he intentions of the US towards Muslims in the region… proved that Washington valued their oil [in reference to Arab disputes] much more than their blood [in reference to BiH]” (Khan, 319).

The US, by prolonging their refusals to put troops on the ground and rejecting several attempts like the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which will be discussed later, lost credibility and was perceptibly undermined by the public, especially when rumor spread that Clinton’s advances might be for re-election results (Daalder, 2016). As the situation intensified, the US increased their involvement. US troops were the bulk of the air force and command used for BiH’s no-fly-zone, and roughly 30% of the $2 billion annual aid cost was provided by the US as well (Hillen III, 1995, 3).

Some organizations, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), were established to respond to war time atrocities. The ICTY specifically was a United Nations court of law handling Balkan war crimes in the 1990s. During its 1993-2017 mandate, the ICTY provided victims an opportunity to put to trial all who were accused of war crimes and mass atrocities within Croatia and BiH (IRMCT, 2022). Reports surrounded killings, torture, sexual abuse in detention camps, enslavement, destruction of property, etc. listed in the Tribunal’s Statute (SoT, 2022). Human rights are rarely seen as an important in peace agreements throughout history (Woyach, October 23), but it is essential that the international community realize this is a place that has been torn apart from a neglect of human rights. Thus, the question of human rights must be contemplated in any and all BiH peace agreements and interventions. Trials with the ICTY and NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Woyach, October 23) aimed to help deter subsequent crime, bring justice to tortured victims and families, and contribute to an enduring peace the region.

Other organizations like the OIC and countries like Pakistan or Iran gave less objective support in the conflict. The OIC, Iran, and Pakistan were key figures and protagonists of the Bosniaks, as were several terrorist organizations, such as the Mujahedeen and Hezbollah, due to their shared Muslim religion. The OIC considered the situation in BiH to be a major concern for the Muslim world that needed to be internationally recognized. They were determined to encourage intervention, stop aggression in Bosnia, lift the arms embargo, and provide financial assistance (Karcic, 2013, 321). Sixteen OIC foreign ministers met in Pakistan to discuss the potential involvement of OIC member state forces as troops in the UNPROFOR mission in BiH and soon sent 7,600 soldiers to secure Muslim safe spaces (Karcic, 2013, 329). Pakistan provided Bosniaks with weapons and anti-tank missiles in spite of the arms embargo and airlifted Bosniaks from BiH into safe zones within Pakistan. The Inter-Services Intelligence delivered a steady supply of weapons, a $20 million loan was later converted into a “gift,” and continued developmental relief from Pakistan followed with the support of nations like Turkey (Yousaf, 2022). Bosniaks also intercepted the help of the Mujahedeen via hundreds of enlisted war battalion soldiers in 1992, which were also suspected of kidnapping and murdering aid workers in addition to executing 20 Croatian prisoners of war (Urban, 2015). At least 400 Lebanese Hezbollah fighters
were also fighting for the Bosniaks, with Iran simultaneously providing immense arms shipments and $200 million to Bosnian Islamic groups (Khatab, 2020).

Altogether, this line-up of outside involvement insinuates that, although the Serbs had a more immediate advantage in acquiring arms, the monetary and long-term advantages seem to be in the hands of the Bosniaks. It also alludes to the following: more organizations and peoples are funding/encouraging the war than they are funding/encouraging a cease-fire during the early 90s. This, of course, makes outside intervention in the terms of peace keeping or peace enforcement difficult, since more incentives for a cease-fire will need to be found in a terrain where a classic case of the security dilemma is beginning to evolve – where no three factions can truly trust the other to disarm, agree to a cease-fire, follow guidelines to a cease-fire, or not simply kill time via fake peace to grow in military power.

**Early Involvement**

Tito’s posterchild of interethnic forces soon derailed in what could be seen as one of the bloodiest ethnic battles in Eastern Europe. Male children as young as 13 years old were forcibly conscripted to fight for Croatian paramilitary units and Bosniaks began mutilating Serbs on open streets all around Eastern Bosnia (Ve. Lucic). Women, elderly, and children were immediately shipped off by the Croatian government in trucks to sports centers on various Croatian islands for safety (Va. Lucic). People like Velimir Lucic had to feed a family of eight on his own since his father was murdered without reason by Bosniaks. After forced conscription and the public executions of his people, many Croats and Serbs were forced to disguise their identities or flee from the now Muslim-occupied Zenica. As a 15-year-old he was on the street, selling family valuables in flea markets, putting his life at risk every day because of his hidden half-Serb half-Croat identity (Ve. Lucic). Of the Northeast front, Velimir said, “[Bosniaks] had the mujahadeens on their team. We had no one. The Muslim generals never got prosecuted for their war crimes, but Croats and Serbs were all prosecuted.” Of the Southwest front, Valentina said, “Before the evacuation, the sky was red and so close to the ground. War was next to me – [Croatian] militias and military protecting people against [Muslim and Serbian] occupation. People were running without direction. Everyone is in a rush and no one knew what was going on.” The perspectives of they-are-killing-my-family-and-taking-my-land were huge factors in the perception of war being the only option.

From May 1992, Bosnian-Serb forces used shelling and sniping to target civilian areas of cities and key institutions, killing, wounding, and inflicting terror upon the civilians. Almost all of Sarajevo’s cultural, religious, and residential buildings were either partially or completely destroyed (Bosnian War, 2022). There were early efforts to prevent war, such as the Cutileiro-Carrington Plan, which would have divided BiH into three autonomous, ethnically defined areas, loosely held together by a weak central government (Szasz 693). This was quickly rejected due to the Serb and Bosniaks’ refusal to power-share on all administrative levels, especially the Serbs – who at the time had heavier weaponry and more established control over territory (Bosnian War, 2022). The year 1992 was riddled with various UN resolutions, all of which seemed to only lead to more conflict. Operation Provide Promise, a humanitarian aid mission launched via US army and air force airlifts on the contingency of Balkan cease-fire (Brown, 16), ultimately only aided factions in refueling through easy access to food and medical supplies (Hillen III, 1995, 3). In the wake of Resolution 713 [the trade embargo], NATO would also implement sky surveillance missions such as Maritime Monitor and Operation Sky Monitor to track and inspect cargo and its destination, as well as report all findings to NATO (Leurdiijk, 460). Although there were violations of Resolution 781, no military action was taken against violators (NATO, 2022).

A slightly more successful, yet still failed, plan that arose was the 1992 Vance-Owen Plan. The plan called for dividing BiH into 10 provinces governed by local communal majorities, with Serbs controlling about 43% and Croats/Muslims about 25% each of BiH (Maass, 1993). Serbs immediately rejected the plan after reviewing the contract and seeing nearly 40% of their current territory would be seized (Maass, 1993). Additionally, pro-Bosniak critics viewed the agreement as tantamount to accepting the ethnic divisions of Bosnia and the acceptance of violent territorial gains against Bosniaks (Ahmad, 1998, 86). Generally, this and all other peace plans circulating the international sphere
called for a division of BiH without really understanding the reason for conflict – the fear of becoming minorities. "Its
time has passed," said Michael Clarke, Defense Studies Institute director in London. "A signed peace agreement would
not make a difference on the ground" (Maass, 1993). These plans had unintentionally spurred the Serbs and Croats to
solidify their temporary positions, especially Bosnian Croats, who were severely underrepresented and scrambling to
establish their own statelet in BiH (Karcic, 329).

BiH’s state was not improving, and the international community felt immediate, stronger measures were
needed. By 1993, UN resolution 816 extended the air ban to cover all flights not authorized by UNPROFOR to
prevent armament shipping to Yugoslavia (JFC NAPLES, 2022). Operation Deny Flight enforced Resolution 816’s
ban on all flights through Bosnian airspace with the use of military action, which escalated the war after NATO shot
down four Serbian aircrafts violating the no-fly-zone (Leurdijk, 461). The US repeatedly advised that the UN agree
to NATO air strikes to punish Serb forces and protect UNPROFOR safe areas. Those actually placing their troops at
risk by participating in the UN operations were hesitant to agree, especially since they only expected to contribute
humanitarian assistance (Daalder, 2016). Ultimately, NATO would continue to launch more isolated air strikes. Bos-
nian Serbs reacted by seizing, holding hostage, and chaining over 400 NATO/UNPROFOR members to key military
targets as human shields to prevent further airstrikes on Serb positions (Hillen III, 1995, 4). Consensus quickly
emerged that air strikes did more harm than good (Daalder, 2016). Serbs no longer saw the West as impartial and
accused them of “flagrant interference in the conflict” and siding with Bosniaks (Hillen III, 1995, 4). The hostages
were internationally televised, and donors like George Soros, who donated $50 million, said, “This mission was to
deliver humanitarian… but their function was to serve as hostages to prevent western military action” (S. Ahmad,
1998). This embarrassment meant a retreat to traditional peacekeeping principles, which only gave Serbs leeway to
pursue conflict again (Daalder, 2016).

A massacre in Srebrenica resulted in the death of over 7,000 Bosniak men – a mass murder on a scale not
witnessed since WWII (Daalder, 2016). The UN response, Operation Deliberate Force, gave Serbia the following
ultimatum: withdraw all heavy weapons and mortar rounds from a 20-kilometer radius around the city within ten days
and place them under UNPROFOR supervision or face ongoing airstrikes. The operation lasted from August 30th until
September 20th, 1995 and resulted in the destruction of 338 Serb targets before Serbs complied (Atkinson, 1995).
 Critics, notably the Russians, would contend that the UN rushed a response without real proof of Serb guilt. Some
even suggested Bosniak forces might have initiated it to provoke a UN response. Officials say that the burden of proof
is low, and UN scientific reports remain classified (Atkinson, 1995). However, at the end of the day, the West’s
impactful hit on Serb installations and artillery meant that Serbia was significantly depleted and ready to negotiate.

UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force

During the BiH conflict, UNPROFOR played an unprofitable role in bringing about a resolution. UNPROFOR had
originally been deployed in Croatia to ensure that three high-conflict areas in Croatia were demilitarized and that
residents were protected from fear of Serbian armed attack (UNPROFOR, 2022). In June 1992, UNPROFOR had its
mandate extended into BiH. The UN refused to actively intervene in the conflict, but rather let UNPROFOR troops
deliver humanitarian aid and extent protection to various UN-declared “safe areas” (Malcolm, Pickering, Paula,
Lampe, John, 2022). Additionally, UNPROFOR helped protect airports, escort convoys, and repair of power, water,
and sewage systems. UNPROFOR was able to keep Sarajevo’s airport open, which created an avenue for international
involvement in peacekeeping. However, military-related mandates like the protection of safe areas and no-fly-zone
monitoring were done with only 1000 soldiers, which was an inadequate amount to cover the entire BiH region (Szasz,
1995, 687).

After evident inefficiency issues arose, 75000 more soldiers were deployed and the SC would authorize the
use of force to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance (Brown, 16). This Chapter 7 authorization meant
UNPROFOR could act, when necessary, through force during (1) attacks against the safe areas (2) sudden armed
conflict and (3) the deliberate obstruction to the freedom of movement for humanitarian convoys (Leurdijk, 1997,
462), which allowed them to aid in airstrikes and NATO-related missions. Still, with the previously discussed incoherence between international actors in the West, the ineffective use of Chapter 7 with NATO, the UNPROFOR soldier hostages, and factions stealing humanitarian, UNPROFOR became a severely unproductive mission. By March 1995, UNPROFOR had deployed 38,599 military personnel, accrued 167 casualties, and spent a net total of $4,616,725,556 (UNPROFOR, 2022).

If the UN had proceeded first with securing a cease-fire before handling humanitarian aid and reconstruction, the results might have been cheaper and more effective. Although the future is not foreseeable, attempting to enforce peace that is not already secured within the region is not generally possible, especially when the factions are committing war crimes against one another. UNPROFOR was simply not considering the fact that warring factions felt they had more to gain by fighting than through negotiations. No part of this mission had been about attempting to use military, civil, or humanitarian tools to convince Serbian or Bosnian belligerents there was more to gain through nonviolent negotiation instead of conflict, nor were there incentives in place to get these belligerents to cooperate (Hillen, 1995, 1).

Dayton Peace Agreement

UNPROFOR monitored a cease-fire agreement signed by the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces in February 1994, as well as the Bosniak and Bosnian Serbs forces in January 1995 (UNPROFOR, 2022). Fighting in BiH finished on October 11, 1995. From then until December 20th, UNPROFOR monitored the agreed-upon ceasefire as peace negotiations began in Dayton, Ohio. On December 14th, the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed by the main actors to the conflict: Republic of BiH, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under the Dayton Peace Agreement, all foreign fighters were ordered to leave the territory by 1996 (Urban, 2015). The concepts within the Agreement were mixtures of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding (Leurdijk, 1997, 465).

The Dayton Peace Agreement asserted the following main points (OSCE, 2022):

- The three factions were expected to comply with and respect the demarcation of two emerging entities – BiH and the Serbian Republic (Article III);
- Yugoslavia and BiH would recognize one another as sovereign independent States in respect to their assigned borders (Article X);
- The factions were expected to endorse and cooperate with the peace settlement process, in particular that which involved civilian implementation (Annex 10) and the newly created International Police Task Force (Annex 11);
- A Provisional Election Commission would be created, which would implement electoral regulations regarding the “registration of political parties and independent candidates; the eligibility of candidates and voters; the role of domestic and international election observers; the ensuring of an open and fair electoral campaign; and the establishment, publication, and certification of definitive election results” (Annex 3) that the factions would need to obey and adhere to;

The factions agreed to conduct their relations in accordance with the UN Charter, which meant respecting the one another’s regional sovereignty, settling conflict peacefully, and not undermining the political identity of any state (OSCE, 2022). The two entities would now essentially work with a central government under the supervision of a peace process assisted by 60,000 IFOR troops. Over 70 political parties participated in the next election, which is a huge milestone because people used voting as an outlet for expression and did not immediately return to violence (Ahmad, 2022). Hence, the Agreement was successful in ending the current war and finding mutually agreed upon borders for political sovereignty. However, there was an inequitable representation of the Bosnian Croat population within the government and a failure to address issues pertaining to repatriation of militants and refugees (Lampe, 2022). Put in simpler terms, the region is in a fragile, highly decentralized, and ethnically divided state. Although the vast majority of citizens continue to desire sustainable peace, they hold to different ideas about the best configuration
of the state, and some even question its future existence (Malcolm, Pickering, Paula, Lampe, John, 2022). Neighbors
do not trust, nor do they like, each other due to recollections of the violence done to one another, which continues
to complicate peace efforts in the following years. For missions to be successful, however, the belligerents do not
need to like or trust each other – they simply need to “not kill each other” (Woyach, September 30). In other words,
the longer the factions remain involved in peace keeping efforts, the less likely a return to violence will occur, which
is what NATO and UN troops in the following years would hope for after Dayton was implemented.

**UNMIBH: United Nations Mission in BiH**

UNMIBH was explicitly a peacebuilding operation mandated by the SC to carry out human rights investigations from
December 1995 until December 2002. The mandate established a uniform rule of law in BiH by assisting in the refor-
mation and restructuring of local police, as well as assessing the current judicial system and auditing the performance
of police and penal/judicial administrators involved in the maintenance of law and order (Okuizumi, 2002). Integrated
into UNMIBH was Resolution 1035, which established the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the UN civilian
office. The IPTF was composed of 2057 international civilian police officers from 43 countries and was the largest
component of UNMIBH. The IPTF had the right to monitor and inspect any site where law enforcement, detention,
or judicial activities took place without prior approval from senior law enforcement or warrants (Okuizumi, 2002).
BiH’s law enforcement was expected to cooperate with IPTF, as IPTF had the ability to “deauthorize” law enforcement
personnel who obstructed IPTF activities, violated human rights, or failed to meet the criteria listed under Annex 11

As listed in the mandate:

1. The IPTF will receive guidance from the High Representative and periodically report their findings
to the High Representative, the Secretary General of the United Nations, and relay intelligence to
IFOR or other appropriate institutions (Article II)
2. A party’s failure to cooperate with the IPTF (ie. obstruction or interference) will be relayed to the
High Representative and IFOR, who will then take the appropriate action. This can be in the form
of reporting to other parties, convening a trial, consulting the UN or relevant states, etc. (Article V)

UNMIBH began its mission during unpromising conditions. Due to the war, over 200,000 people died,
20,000 were missing and 1.2 million were internally displaced (UNMIBH, 2022). The country was divided along
ethnic lines, and war left a legacy of hatred and widespread fear of retribution. There were over 44,000 local police
forces – three times peacetime strength – all of which were various mono-ethnic paramilitary units entirely unsuited
for civilian law enforcement. Police forces would discriminate against, harass, and intimidate citizens of other ethnic-
ities, which reinforced ethnic division (UNMIBH, 2022). Police also blocked checkpoints along BiH borders and
were easily corruptible. Due to this, UNMIBH’s focus was civilian security and freedom of movement. The active
presence of the 2,057 IPTF patrollers was crucial in creating stability. To promote freedom of movement, UNMIBH
introduced uniform vehicle license plates, eliminating the ability to discriminate easily between ethnicities. By 1999,
the region began to stabilize, and the first significant returns of displaced persons began (UNMIBH, 2022).

The mission then executed the following (all under UNMIBH, 2022):

1. Police reform: individual officers would be assessed for citizenship, criminal records, wartime back-
ground checks, professional performance, verification of appropriate credentials, proof of legal
housing, and the completion of compulsory IPTF training.
2. Police administration: all administrations were expected to have efficient organizational structure,
stay away from political interference, and hold an even multi-ethnic and gender representation.
3. Representation: to increase representation, programs were instituted for the voluntary redeployment of minority law enforcement, police academies for minority cadets, refresher programs for returning former police, and female recruitment campaigns for academies. Minority officers would also receive housing assistance through UNMIBH and its partners.

4. Judicial system: the establishment of the Criminal Justice Advisory Unit would monitor key court cases, liaison between police and judiciary, advise the IPTF on legal matters, and train local police in the implementation of criminal procedures.

5. Institution building: the creation of inter-police force cooperation as well as State-level institutions within the two entities, 10 cantons and a separate district.

6. Borders: establish a State Border Service across the country. By the end of the mandate, the Service controlled the entire border, which was an important achievement. Illegal migrants decreased from 25,000 to a few hundred between 2000-2002, and the Service generated over $1.2 million for the Treasury in 2002 (about $900,000 was seized goods).

7. United Nations: integrate BiH into UN peacekeeping efforts abroad. This was seen as beneficial for “harmonizing police and military cooperation in the country.” BiH would contribute troops to serve in East Timor, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the Congo.

Overall, UNMIBH was fairly successful. Factors that decreased the chance of success were the fact that IPTF troops and BiH peoples did not always speak the same language. Being a third world country, the literacy rate and competence in the English language was not high. However, UNMIBH was successful in creating an environment where the local population and police were interconnected instead of isolating the two groups from each other. Although the mission might have been difficult at first, trust between groups began to grow more organically (Okuizumi, 2002).

IFOR: Implementation Force

In December 1995, IFOR replaced UNPROFOR, whose mandate was terminated, and remained active until December 1996. The SC authorized IFOR deployment to BiH through Resolution 1031 under Chapter 7 authorization to facilitate compliance with the Dayton accords and maintain the ceasefire with ground, air, and maritime capacities (Brown, 15). 32 nations were involved, totaling up to 60,000 personnel (50,000 NATO and 10,000 non-NATO). Military tasks of IFOR mirrored some of the UN’s previous missions, like ensuring self-defense and freedom of movement, monitoring factions, patrolling the airspace and military traffic/routes, and establishing Joint Military Commissions – the central figures for all factions of the peace agreement (DoD, 1997). IFOR also saw to the removal of all UN troops not transferred to IFOR (DoD, 1997).

Specific military objectives for Operation Joint Endeavor (Butler & Boyer, 2003, 397-399):

1. Cessation of hostility in compliance with the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
2. Separation Bosnian Croat armed forces and the Republika Srpska by mid-January 1996
3. Resettlement of forces and heavy weapons to approved/monitored sites by June 1996
4. Patrol the newly established an Inter-Entity Boundary Line of demilitarization
5. Inspect over 800 secured sites where heavy weapons and equipment of factions were relocated

To more effectively secure areas within BiH, NATO organized IFOR into three subordinate commands: Multinational Division (North – US led); Multinational Division (Southwest – British led); and Multinational Division (Southeast – French led) (Brown, 16). The operation created a sense of security within military and civilian organizations (JFC NAPLES, 2022). American soldiers during their missions even found the former warring factions –
exhausted by years of bloodshed – appreciative of their efforts, offering small tokens of gratitude in the form of food and drink (Brown, 21).

Once the execution of military tasks was achieved, the transitioning to peace gave IFOR the ability to pay more attention to civilian needs (JFC NAPLES, 2022). In early 1996, IFOR had expanded its mission to include working closely with organizations like the United Nations High Commission on Refugees and the ICTY in an effort to investigate war crimes and support the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons. In the last six months of its mandate, IFOR also completed civil engineering projects in the form of rebuilding transportation and communication networks and improving infrastructure in the form schools and hospitals (Butler & Boyer, 2003, 403). Major goals for non-military members of IFOR were related to securing free and fair elections, assisting international organizations in humanitarian missions, responding to deliberate violence, aiding the migration of refugees/displaced people, and monitoring the clearance of minefields (DoD, 1997).

The execution of these NATO missions was monumental for the international community. The Russian Federation was in the middle of a transformative period where liberal and nationalistic competing voices over what Russia’s role should be shifted global politics (Woyach, December 9). There was never a solid, coordinated voice in Russia, which led to the West’s mismanagement of Russian relations. However, this was NATO’s first ground force operation, and a US-brokered agreement for Russian participation and the full integration of the Russian Brigade gave a new perspective on how post-Cold War relationships could shift on a grand level. In the end, IFOR can be seen as a mechanism for the militaristic implementation of peace, the creation of conditions that could lead to social reconstruction, and a possible look into how multidimensional peacekeeping and coalitions could transform the future.

**SFOR: Stabilization Force**

SFOR, like IFOR, was a peace enforcement operation and mandated through SC’s publishing of Resolution 1088 (NATO, 2022). However, since the transition from IFOR to SFOR in late 1996, goodwill between factions began to diminish. NATO was criticized for falling short in its efforts to create a lasting reconciliation as well as for their inattentiveness in locating and convicting war criminals at large around BiH (Butler & Boyer, 2003, 406). Due to this, SFOR was determined to prevent a resumption of hostilities and to promote a climate for civil and political restoration. In the following 18 months SFOR was attempting to transfer the responsibility of national development to the factions, having them establish of their own common institutions, infrastructure, and revitalize their own economy (Crouch, 1997). SFOR tasks were similar to that of IFOR, but with more emphasis on civilian tasks and with half the number of soldiers (Leurdijk, 1997, 467). IFOR was a 60,000-soldier mission deployed for one year. Conversely, SFOR was originally a 31,000-troop mission (NATO, 2022). SFOR’s activities ranged from patrolling, supervising demining, arresting indicted criminals, and assisting the return of displaced people to their homes. SFOR also played a large role in various elections, such as the 1997 municipal and the 1997 Republika Srpska special elections, the 1998 national elections, and the 2000 municipal and general elections (NATO, 2022). However, the elections at times had a negative impact on efforts to facilitate self-sustaining peace. Voters, faced uncertainty in their future, would vote for nationalist politicians who consistently promised to protect their ethnicity’s interests (Cousens, 2002, 559-560). This made it harder to find mechanisms to compensate for the hardwired mono-ethnicity built into the Dayton Constitution. Thus, SFOR focused on unification through other means.

Further tasks performed by SFOR include (NATO, 2022):

1. Have Multinational Specialized Units assist the EU Police Mission in helping BiH authorities develop local police forces that meet international standards by monitoring, teaching, and inspecting operational capacities.
2. Collect and destroy unregistered weapons, which resulted in the disposal of over 11,000 weapons and 45,000 grenades.
3. Bring 39 war crime suspects to ICTY in The Hague, as well as provide logistical support to ICTY investigative teams.
4. Launch Civil-Military Cooperation projects for structural engineering and transportation.
5. Maintain and repair roads/railways with local authorities and international agencies.

On 25 October 1999, a visible improvement in the security of BiH resulted in the reduction and restructuring of SFOR. What had originally been 30,00 SFOR troops dropped to 19,000 troops in 2001 and 7,000 troops in 2004 (NATO, 2022).

**EUFOR: European Union Force**

In 2004, member states acting through or in cooperation with the European Union (EU) established a multinational stabilization force (EUFOR), which would take over after SFOR ended. EUFOR deployed a military force of just under 7,000 troops to BiH to ensure compliance with the Dayton Agreement and to maintain security within BiH. The troops were evenly sectioned off into three to cover North, Northwest, and Southeast BiH – Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Mostar respectively – with EUFOR Headquarters centered in Sarajevo (Zeherovic, 2022). EUFOR’s main reason for deployment was to create an authority with BiH that would become a ‘security provider’ to the nation rather than a ‘security consumer’ of UN/NATO troops. In February 2007, troop levels had been decreased to around 1,600, but EUFOR increased its overall situational awareness within BiH by introducing Liaison and Observation Teams to the area (Zeherovic, 2022). In 2012, the operation shifted its focus to capacity building and training the Armed Forces of BiH. This successfully concluded in 2018 after the military achieved self-sustainability through military training. In 2022, approximately 1,100 EUFOR troops remain in BiH, whose primary focus is assisting the government in maintaining national security (Zeherovic, 2022). EUFOR also embraced the EU’s increasing engagement in BiH.

The EU’s main political objectives (Gnesotto, 2005, 323):

1. Long Term: create a stable, cooperative, and multiethnic BiH that is “irreversibly on track” towards EU membership.
2. Short Term: strengthen local capacity building through the support of BiH authorities and reinforce EUFOR by any means necessary to smoothly transition from SFOR to EUFOR.

A strong commitment of the international community remains necessary in BiH to help build a self-sustaining and democratic country, especially with the 2003 Thessaloniki Declaration confirming a possible future for BiH within the EU (Gnesotto, 2005, 324). EUFOR supports BiH’s progress towards EU integration by its own efforts and promotes overall EU political coordination in BiH (Zeherovic, 2022). The operation remains ongoing. The costs of the military operation were $71.7 million, with personnel and other items on a “costs lie where they fall” basis (Gnesotto, 2005, 325).

**Lasting Effects**

The World Bank estimated that the war casted $20 billion in damage on the nation, BiH owed over $120 million in loans by 1998, and BiH’s currencies have changed several times since the end of the war (Ahmad, 1998, 48-49). This led to economic instability and affected various social and structural aspects of society. People would steal crops from one another to sustain themselves, and to this day one can still see factories and buildings riddled with bullet and grenade holes, left and abandoned, throughout the nation (Va. Lucic, 2022). Estimates say hundreds of thousands of displaced persons would return to their prewar homes, but a significant portion would resettle in areas where they would be the majority ethnic group (Malcolm, Pickering, Paula, Lampe, John, 2022).
When BiH was within Yugoslavia, the region had one of the lowest death rates, the highest birth rates, and
the highest natural increasing rate of population in the nation. By the early 2000s, however, the birth rate declined,
the death rate rose, and the natural rate of increase had fallen below zero (Malcolm, Pickering, Paula, Lampe, John,
2022). PTSD and aggression also became rampant in the Balkans. Around four thousand Republika Srpska soldiers
committed suicide from 1995 to 2012, and, in 2008, three Bosniak youths stabbed a 17-year-old Croat to death on a
Sarajevo tram (Džidić & Dzidic, 2018). Some PTSD was even a result of the peacekeepers, seeing as reports have
surfaced of UN soldiers participating in the rape of women and children in brothels and camps (Gutman, 1993).

Another critical dimension of the conflict would be the coordination of relief efforts for displaced peoples.
In all wars, displaced people are those in most need of humanitarian assistance. Half of the Bosnian population (4.4
million people) were displaced prior to the Dayton Peace Agreement (Woyach, November 9). However, internally
displaced people do not enter into any international treaties because they are the responsibility of the state in which
they currently reside instead of the international community. In this case, the state of BiH was in shambles and the
amount of internally displaced peoples outnumbered the international refugees. Thus, it would have been hard for the
Bosnian government to provide relief, being economically unstable, and no relief from the international community
was meeting the needs of those people who were internally displaced.

This is not to say all events leading up to today are grim. Since the 1990s, nations like the US have provided
approximately $2 billion in assistance for humanitarian aid, reconstruction, economic development, and the modern-
ization of its defense sector (DoS, 2021). In June 1998, the BiH High Representative also established the Independent
Media Commission to reduce propagation of ethnic hatred within the region (Malcolm, Pickering, Paula, Lampe, John,
2022). A former Bosnian Serb leader, Ratko Mladic, was sentenced to life in prison after being found guilty of
genocide (Masters, 2017) and various other trials and advancements took place. Generally, in recent years
the Bosnian Croats, Bosniaks, and Bosnian Serbs live peacefully and coexist without massive, violent con-
frontation –some even befriend each other (Ve. Lucic, 2022). All in all, the status of the country at this time
is stable and there is no imminent threat of a return to war. This probably comes as a relief to the West, who
hope to incorporate the nation into their own organizations and future agendas. This is possibly itching Russia
the wrong way due to the fear that another ex-Communist ally could be lost to the West.

Analysis

Post conflict peace building for civil wars should give priority to objectives that will (1) secure a viable and sustainable
cease-fire, (2) create the conditions necessary for internal conflict resolution between belligerents, and (3) end inter-
national presence in the conflict-ridden country in a way where an independent normalization of domestic affairs can
occur (Cousens, 2002, 558). Democratization and postwar justice can be secondary to, or proceed after, the previous
three goals addressed. Success in BiH could not occur until a cease-fire had been initiated, which is ultimately why
UNPROFOR failed miserably. The best initial response would have been to facilitate mediation and move the three
factions towards negotiation. Putting peacekeepers into a warzone was due to a lack of proper judgement and resulted
in complete failure. Long-term stability, conditions promoting self-sustaining peace, and the downsizing of interna-
tional presence can only occur with an emphasis on the physical reconstruction of the warring government (Cousens,
2002, 558). This would be easier to achieve with consent, which would have been easier to gain if the international
community sat down and assessed the reason for the Bosnian conflict (fear of becoming a minority group) and the
conditions of the Bosnian state (economically unstable and turbulent).

In general, the case of Bosnia was a 3rd ecology conflict (Doyle, 2002, 82) – meaning it was a conflict between
a few, hostile, coherent factions. As seen in the use of collective security via the UN and NATO, as well as in the use
of transitional authority through the development of resources such as the Office of the High Representative, more
collective and transitional authority is needed in order to evolve factions from hostile to obedient and peaceful. Yet,
transitional authority can be insufficient when communication and unclear or instruction is underspecified/not imme-
diately provided. Ideally, authority should be immediately imposed by the SC at the onset of the mission, rather than
After earlier efforts fail. In the case of BiH, there were narrow interpretations of what constituted security and a lack of coordination between the civilian and military pillars of the Dayton process. This led to debilitating effects on civilian missions, since Croatian and Serbian refugees would return to areas where they were now minorities and be exposed to forces leading exclusion campaigns to bolster their power (Doyle, 2002, 82).

Another flaw of peace enforcement and collective security action in this conflict was that humanitarian efforts were not tied to policies that convinced belligerents they had more to gain by negotiating than by fighting. In the early phase of the conflict, when no incentives were given to belligerents to cooperate, factions felt as though they had the least to gain by negotiation since they did not feel they could trust the other factions (Doyle, 2002, 82). Incentives could have helped with transparency between parties, coordinating insurance, and providing economic rehabilitation assistance to those that cooperated with the peace process. Additionally, prospects for success, even with robust transitional authority, are very low. Thus, an exceptional multilateral and international commitment to peace process is needed to overcome incentives for continuing conflict (Doyle, 2002, 84). The international community should never promise nation-building, peace enforcement, or humanitarian protection without the resources and the commitment to make those missions happen.

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