Emotional and Cognitive Processes in Moral Choices: A Review of the Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgment

Authors

  • Jenna Kim Los Gatos High School
  • Dr. Minyoung Lee

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47611/jsrhs.v13i3.7418

Keywords:

morality, dual-process theory, decision-making, fMRI, brain lesion, emotion, cognition, neuroimaging, human behavior, moral cognition, moral judgment

Abstract

The investigation of moral behavior has become prevalent in cognitive neuroscience. A prominent framework within this field is the dual-process theory. Initially proposed to address discrepancies in the trolley and footbridge dilemmas, the dual-process theory has been influential in understanding moral behavior, proposing that two systems, emotion and cognition, play distinct roles in shaping moral judgments. Emotion-driven deontological decisions are contrasted with cognition-driven utilitarian decisions. This paper will review the dual-process theory of moral decision-making, examining both its evidence and some of its key criticisms.

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Author Biography

Dr. Minyoung Lee

PhD in Psychology from Stanford, with a focus on cognitive neuroscience

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Published

08-31-2024

How to Cite

Kim, J., & Lee, M. (2024). Emotional and Cognitive Processes in Moral Choices: A Review of the Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgment. Journal of Student Research, 13(3). https://doi.org/10.47611/jsrhs.v13i3.7418

Issue

Section

HS Research Articles