

Critical Review of the Possibility of Returning to Stagflation in the U.S. in 2024

Seyoon Jeong

Branksome Hall Asia, Republic of Korea

ABSTRACT

In May, 2024, the U.S. Federal Reserve announced that while inflation remains relatively high and economic growth has slowed, there has been no indication of stagflation. However, the news media have used the term “stagflation” with increasing frequency in relation to the United States economy. While there is ample evidence that causes of stagflation are observable, the academic article on the subject has not moved beyond discussing the possibility of stagflation in 2024. Specifically, there is a relative lack of research that explores why the U.S. economy will face stagflation possibly in 2024. This article-review posits that stagflation returned in 2024 or stagnation will return in 2024 by reviewing articles in relation to 1) the causes of stagflation, 2) the World Bank’s 24-Year Global Economic Outlook, 3) the collapse of international monopoly capitalism and the US response to the US industrial protection policy and 4) the paradox of the dollar’s key monetary system.

Introduction

In May 2024, the U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said that while inflation remains relatively high and economic growth has slowed, there has been no indication of stagflation (NBC, 2024). However, in recent months, the news media have used the term “stagflation” with increasing frequency in relation to the United States economy (e.g. Fortune, 2024). This term signifies a combination of rising prices (i.e., inflation) and sluggish economic growth (Empower, 2024).

The phenomenon of stagflation was particularly prominent in the 1970s when it afflicted numerous countries (CEPR, 2022). In the US, it remains associated with the oil embargo of 1973, which triggered disastrous rises in the cost of energy. Indeed, while the embargo per se was removed the following year, its effects persisted into the 1980s. This period also saw U.S. inflation rise from 5.8 to 13.5%, while unemployment increased from a base of 4.9% to 9.7%. A so-called “misery index” was formulated to capture the impact of stagflation on the national quality of life (Halton, 2019). Derived from a straightforward combination of the inflation and joblessness indices, the misery index reached double digits in the late 1970s, peaking at 20.8 in 1980.

While Jerome Powell estimates that there has been no signal to indicate the return of stagflation, this paper posits that stagflation returned in 2024 or stagnation will return in 2024 by reviewing articles in relation to 1) the causes of stagflation, 2) the World Bank’s 24-Year Global Economic Outlook, 3) the collapse of international monopoly capitalism and the US response to the US industrial protection policy and 4) the paradox of the dollar’s key monetary system. When combined, these factors suggest the possibility of stagflation returning to the US in 2024.

Review of Literature

Cause of Stagflation

Stagflation derives from a variety of factors. Key among them are a lower domestic production of goods and services, generally poor economic performance, the tightening of monetary policy, and unusually high increases in consumer pricing (Agarwal, 2022). The impact of these variables on stagflation is both direct and indirect. Moreover, stagflation may be driven by ill-informed monetary policy, sudden declines in supplies for services and goods, and mergers and acquisitions. When these factors, or some of them, coalesce, stagflation may be the result (Conerly, 2022). Although stagflation received acute scholarly attention in the 1970s, it was by no means confined to that decade. The Covid-19 pandemic, for example, caused massive damage to the global economy, which was later compounded by the effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, particularly in terms of energy and agricultural prices. Together, these disasters have served to slow the rate of global economic growth, resulting in higher inflation, and in many states, feeble GDP performance (Kilfoyle, 2023).

As an indication of the problems now facing policymakers, global economic growth fell from 5.7% in 2022 to 2.9% the following year. Partly as a result, stagflation, which was already discernible in 2023, is expected to persist throughout 2024. In this context, the greatest risks pertain to those countries and businesses that are already performing poorly. Economists, meanwhile, face the daunting task of devising anti-recessionary strategies while fending off the attention of speculators. The most effective mechanisms for avoiding economic contraction are global rather than national. Even today, for example, the impact of Covid-19 remains striking, and further efforts are needed to ensure adequate treatment and vaccination, particularly in low-income states. To sustain global markets, meanwhile, international support for supply chains is required (World Bank, 2022).

The present period is, in several respects, reminiscent of the stagflation decade of the 1970s. Economic data from many international economies has given economists cause for concern. Although the intensity of the stagflation threat is difficult to discern, the reality of pending stagnation is indicated by globally high rates of inflation coupled with globally disappointing levels of economic activity. This is particularly concerning for actors who rely heavily on revenues tied to market performance, such as investors and market-driven businesses. Market performance is depressed when the demand for goods and services is persistently low, as is the case today (The Economist, 2021).

A challenging global economic situation emerged in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and it has intensified stagflation pressures (IMF Annual Report, 2022). Specifically, the Ukrainian War has generated shockwaves in terms of commodity prices. It has also led to the serious disruption of international supply chains, which even powerful actors, such as multinationals and advanced-state governments, are struggling to stabilize. The response to Russia's invasion has taken the form of international sanctions that are both economic and diplomatic in nature, but the impact of these measures is not confined to their intended targets. Sanctions have indeed exacerbated the ongoing supply issues for essential commodities like wheat and other grains, as well as for energy resources (Bilali & Hassen, 2024).

The impact of Covid-19 on the world economy has been amplified by the war in Ukraine. Various countries, advanced and otherwise, have implemented policy initiatives to mitigate or ward off stagflation, but it remains unclear how effective such measures will be (Canuto, 2022). Moreover, once stagflation takes hold, its precise influence on consumers and economies is difficult to predict. In fact, once stagflation becomes entrenched, its effects begin to be internalized by the public, who adjust their lifestyles accordingly. For governments, meanwhile, policy levers are available to mitigate the harm of stagflation, and even to escape it, but all of these involve unpalatable choices of some kind (Brunner, et. al, 1980).

The World Bank's 24-Year Global Economic Outlook

The World Bank released its "Global Economic Prospects" in January 2024. Its global economic growth forecast for 2024 is 2.4% (1.2% in developed countries and 3.9% in developing countries). The global economic growth rate is expected to slow for three consecutive years from 2022 to 2024 due to tight monetary policies worldwide.

However, a slight improvement is anticipated in 2025 as the economy begins to recover. (Wheeler & Papagianni, 2024). The World Bank maintains that the possibility of easing monetary policies due to price stability is positive, but downside factors such as geopolitical tensions, tightening trade regulations, and China's economic slowdown may prevent this from happening. International organizations other than the World Bank are also generally predicting a recession in the global economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects a decline in global growth from 3.0% in 2023 to 2.9% in 2024, as reported in October 2023. Similarly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) predicts a decline from 2.9% in 2023 to 2.7% in 2024, as reported in November 2023. By region, the World Bank predicts that most developing countries will maintain growth despite the slowdown in the U.S.-China economy (The Worldbank, 2024).

The World Bank's 2024 Global Economic Outlook presents several statistics in terms of the 2024 global economic forecaste (World Bank, 2024). Firstly, they are expected to see their overall listing rate fall due to the slowdown in the U.S. (the overall growth rate of advanced economies is expected to fall from 1.5% in 2023 to 1.2% in 2024). The U.S. is expected to grow by 1.6% in 2024, down from 2.5% in 2023, indicating a potential recession. The decline in the growth rate is due to less consumption and investment due to reduced excess savings, high interest rates, and slower employment. The Eurozone is forecasting weak growth from 0.4% in 2023 to 0.7% in 2024 as tight monetary policies continue. Emerging developing countries are forecasting that the overall growth rate of emerging countries will fall from 4.0% in 2023 to 3.9% in 2024 due to China's economic slowdown. In the East Asia-Pacific region, the growth rate outside of China is expected to improve, but as China's growth slows, the overall growth rate in the East Asia-Pacific region is expected to decline from 5.1% in 2023 to 4.5% in 2024. China is forecasting a decline from 5.2% in 2023 to 4.5% in 2024 due to increased uncertainty, and continued vulnerability in the asset sector. Outside of China, strong private consumption is expected to grow from 4.4% in 2023 to 4.7% in 2024. Europe and Central Asia are forecasting that the overall growth rate of the region will fall from 2.7% in 2023 to 2.4% in 2024 due to the impact of the Russia-Ukrainian War, but regions other than Russia and Ukraine are forecast to grow from 2.7% in 2023 to 3.1% in 2024. Latin America is expected to rise from 2.2% in 2023 to 2.3% in 2024, drive by potential policy rate cuts due to price stabilization and the recovery of international tourism (such as the Caribbean). The Middle East and North Africa are expected to rise from 1.9% in 2023 to 3.5% in 2024 due to increased oil production unless the Middle East conflict intensifies further. South Asia is expected to maintain the highest regional growth rate from 5.7% in 2023 to 5.6% in 2024 due to solid domestic demand and India's robust growth (6.4% in 24 years). Sub-Saharan regions are expected to grow from 2.9% in 2023 to 3.8% in 2024 due to improved financial conditions.

Based on the global economic outlook data, the World Bank has warned that global growth will slow for a third year in a row in 2024, which means many developing countries will experience prolonged poverty and weakened debt levels. High-interest rates and persistent inflation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have depressed trade China. In other words, the first half of the 2020s looks set to be the worst half-decade performance in three decades. This indicates that even the World Bank is concerned about a potential economic recession, which could trigger stagflation. Additionally, deeply indebted poor countries may struggle to afford the necessary investments to combat climate change and poverty.

The Collapse of International Monopoly Capitalism and The Response of the U.S.

International monopoly capitalism has been in recession for three consecutive years from 2022 to 2024 (Wiseman, 2024). An economic downturn occurs when a country's growth rate has declined compared to the previous year. The World Bank expects the global economy to emerge from the recession around 2025. International monopoly capitalism virtually came to an end after the 2008 financial panic. Capitalism has evolved through three stages: free competition capitalism, monopoly capitalism, and state monopoly capitalism. After the 1980s,

capitalism morphed into international monopoly capitalism. The panic in 2008 ended the international monopoly capitalism system and started the transition period of capitalism. It can be said that capitalism is currently in the process of deepening its transition period. From the perspective of globalization, this can be said to be a transition period when the first globalization ends and the second globalization begins (Hutchinson, 2023).

When globalization is defined as an increase in the ratio of trade to the production of the global economy, it can be observed that the global economy has experienced two waves of globalization since the Industrial Revolution. (Ospina, 2018). In general, globalization from the late 19th century to the outbreak of World War I is referred to as globalization I, and globalization from the establishment of the Bretton Woods system after the end of World War II to the these days is referred to as globalization II. Globalization began with a rapid increase in global trade in the late 19th century and ended with the outbreak of World War I, thanks to the development of transportation and communication technologies after the Industrial Revolution (Vanham, 2019). From the mid-1910s to the 1940s, global trade stagnated due to two world wars, the Great Depression, and protectionist policies. During this period, the ratio of global trade to GDP fell to as low as one-third of its peak level. (Baldwin, 2022).

Globalization II began after the end of World War II with the inauguration of the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference and The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Office of the Historian, 2024). Despite the second globalization, the period from the 1980s to before the global financial crisis shows a trend of further expanding and upgrading the scope and content of globalization, which can be called the stage of international monopoly capitalism. International monopoly capitalism began in the 1960s with the formation of international financial capital beyond state control, driven by the expansion of the Eurodollar market. It was completed when the oil dollars were absorbed in the 1970s and capital liquidity was achieved in the 1980s. The characteristic of international monopoly capitalism is the free movement of capital (Enfu and Global, 2021). In this way, financial capital is globalized beyond the scope of a country. The globalization of finance promotes and is based on the globalization of production, which is characterized by a global value chain rather than just simple trade expansion. This second globalization was stimulated by the success of the East Asian economy based on export-led growth resulting in developing countries participating more in globalization. Especially after the end of the Cold War, China and the Eastern Bloc participated, greatly expanding the regional scope of globalization. The imperialist ruling system of international monopoly capitalism is the establishment of a hierarchical imperialist order with the United States at its peak. International monopoly capitalism is characterized by financial looting as well as labor exploitation. Before the financial crisis, during the second period of globalization, global trade increased at a rate about twice that of global GDP. As a result, the 'global trade/GDP' ratio has risen to a level far above that of the first globalization. However, as the growth rate of global trade slowed significantly after the global financial crisis and the subsequent long-term panic, the upward trend of the 'global trade/GDP' ratio stopped. The possibility of re-enacting the upward trend is slim, so it can be said that the second globalization has virtually ended, and international monopoly capitalism also no longer exists (Foster, 2022).

After the financial crisis, the growth rate of global trade declined significantly, and direct investment between countries has slowed further than trade. The collapse of international monopoly capitalism can be found in overproduction and a decrease in the rate of profit, but structurally, it can be found in the imbalance of international monopoly capitalism (Doctorow, 2024). To put it very simply, it is the imbalance between consumption and production in the United States and China. The United States consumes and China produces. The value products produced by China are exchanged for U.S. dollars. China then uses these dollars to purchase U.S. government bonds. The United States has a circular structure in which it prints dollars by issuing government bonds. In this structure, value is consumed without producing value. This circular structure cannot be maintained for the same reason why one cannot live by borrowing money indefinitely. In the end, the 2008 financial panic exploded this contradiction, which collapsed the international monopoly capitalist system (Harvey, 2010). Accordingly, anti-globalization sentiment is spreading in advanced countries, and global trade is being reorganized

due to the U.S.-China conflict (Crow & Niblett, 2024). As the structural contradictions of international monopoly capitalism have greatly increased unemployment and the issue of inequality has emerged, anti-globalization public opinion has spread and protectionist measures have expanded in advanced countries. In addition, as the U.S. pursues decoupling from China amid the U.S.-China conflict and pressures its allies to join, global trade is shrinking and the global economy is becoming more fragmented. This fragmentation is expected to accelerate due to the ongoing wars between Russia and Ukraine and between Israel and Palestine.

The specific form of the new capitalist system that will emerge after the collapse of the international monopoly capitalist system is still unknown. However, if we look back on the situation after the end of globalization I, we can predict that tax evasion will accelerate, and the global economy will be blocked. The U.S.-China conflict is intensifying, and in recent years, the protectionist policy of advanced imperialism is also expanding. Industrial policies aimed at expanding the self-sufficiency of major high-tech industries are spreading, centering on advanced imperialism in the United States and Europe. The United States presents industrial policies for expanding its employment and fostering high-tech industries as its first economic task. If advanced empires competitively promote industrial policies to protect their industries, global trade will shrink and the global economy will inevitably be blocked. It is highly likely that the next few years to a decade will be an important time to determine the specific form of the next capitalist system (Dolan, 2022).

As for the specific form of the new capitalist system, the development trend of the US-China conflict and the response of other countries are expected to be the main variables (Kennedy 2024). As for the specific form of the new capitalist system, the U.S. is the major player in leading the change. The U.S. has made curbing China's rise as a hegemonic competitor its top political and security priority. To this end, it is pursuing a strategy to change the structure of the capitalist system. Accordingly, the U.S. is pursuing decoupling with China, especially in high-tech industries and technologies, and is pressuring its allied countries to follow suit. In principle, no significant change or difference has yet been observed in actual policy. It is estimated that China will suffer a significant economic blow while the U.S. will experience a relatively smaller impact (El-Erian, 2024). The analysis is that the U.S. is the least affected by the deterioration of the trade environment, as it is the country with the lowest trade dependence among advanced economies and is economically self-sufficient.

The Paradox Between the U.S. Industrial Protection Policy and The Dollar's Reserve Currency System

The U.S. economy serves as a barometer for the global economy because it quickly reflects the overall direction of global economic trends (Mousina, 2024). Therefore, examining the U.S. economy over the past 23 years can provide insights into the direction of the global economy in 2024. The U.S. economy has been strong for 23 years amid the global economic downturn. The U.S. has a service consumption-oriented economic structure, so the economy has been good, unlike manufacturing-oriented countries. Strong U.S. consumption is attributable to pandemic-induced subsidies, increased government fiscal spending for five consecutive quarters from the third quarter of 2022 to the third quarter of 2023, and increased investment in the U.S. as part of the supply chain restructuring process.

Most international organizations, including the World Bank, predict that the world, including the U.S., will enter a recession this year. However, there are problems to overcome for the economy to return to growth next year after overcoming the recession this year. It remains difficult to predict whether these challenges can be successfully addressed or if they will lead to deeper economic issues (Gill & Kose, 2024). The central problem in the global economy is the dollar-dominated system. This is the so-called dollar-based monetary problem. This is an essential problem of international monopoly capitalism, and since the gold standard was abolished in the 1930s, the dollar system as the gold exchange standard has been maintained in international trade. In the 1970s, even this was abolished by suspending the gold convertibility of the dollar. Since then, the dollar has

functioned as an international reserve currency. This is an external force based on the economic and military power of the United States. It is called agenda currency (fake currency). Agenda currency can be issued indefinitely in theory. Currency issuance equates to accumulating debt. After all, international monopoly capitalism is a debt-centered economic structure. However, the debt-centered economic structure has collapsed presenting the United States with two contradictory tasks.

The first task is to maintain the dollar-based currency, and the second task is to establish a domestic manufacturing ecosystem centered on high-tech industries. These two tasks or goals are contradictory to each other. Maintaining the dollar-based currency is to maintain the nominal value of the dollar. To do so, prices need to be kept low. This is why the United States raised its benchmark interest rate to 5.5%. If gold, the real currency, is held as a reserve, its value is maintained. In other words, the purchasing power is maintained. Therefore, for fake currency to replace real currency, it must maintain the purchasing power of the fake currency. This is achieved through managing interest rates denominated in dollars.. Additionally, the dollars released into the market must be recovered. This is because the nominal value of the dollar, which serves as the indicator of value, can only be sustained when the supply of dollars is reduced relative to the overall value. This policy is implemented through quantitative tightening by the U.S central bank, the Federal Reserve System (the Fed), which aims to recover \$95 billion worth of its holdings and mortgage securities every month.

Establishing a manufacturing ecosystem, which is the second goal, entails fiscal spending. The US public debt reached \$34 trillion at the end of 2023 thanks to increased fiscal spending for five consecutive quarters from the third quarter of 2022 to the third quarter of 2023 (Congressional Budget Office, 2023). The Fed's tightening of monetary policy, while the US government increases fiscal spending, effectively boosts the US economy by drawing in global value . However, the establishment of a manufacturing ecosystem itself contradicts the dollar system as a key currency. A key currency must maintain a chronic trade deficit to supply dollars to the world. However, increasing import tariffs and replacing imports by fostering domestic manufacturing means that the world will not supply dollars. Similarly, US energy exports, as the US becomes the largest producer of crude oil and natural gas, contribute to this effect. The magazine titled 'The Economist' postulates that this is a gift of God to the US, but it cannot be a gift for the dollar-based monetary system (The Economist, 2023). Fundamentally, the US industrial policy aimed at protecting its own industries conflicts with the dollar-based system. Overcoming this contradiction remains an open question.

Navigating Stagflation: Critical Implications for 2024 U.S. Fed Policy

The global economy is now in a completely different environment than the pre-pandemic era characterized by low interest rates, prices, and growth. As outlined previously, the rise in interest rates increase government debt risks, economic fragmentation is exacerbated by tax evasion, and attempts to replace dollar settlements with other currencies such as the yuan in international transactions are underway (IMF, 2024). Moreover, the environment may be conducive to stagflation as growth shrinks due to "non-economic threats" such as the U.S.-China conflict.

This complicated current economic situation presents a dilemma for the Federal Reserve.. The Fed's most important means for implementing monetary policy is the federal funds rate. It aims to stimulate economic activity by lowering the target federal funds rate, which is tied to commercial rates, and making it easier for banks to lend money to consumers and businesses (Wessel, 2024). However, this approach risks expanding the money supply and fueling inflation. Of course, by raising interest rates and curtailing the money supply, the Fed may attempt to reduce inflation, but it loses the ability to stimulate the economy. Many economists believe that the Fed's focus on the immediate threat of a recession is justified while others criticize it for overreacting to the current situation and repeating the mistakes that led to stagflation in the years after the embargo (Buchwald, 2024). The reason is, as the U.S. economy is expected to slow down, the Fed's will have no choice but to lower its benchmark interest rate if demand slows and unemployment rises.

However, this outlook reflects the collective hopes of market participants and policymakers worldwide. As seen above, the United States currently employing a combination of quantitative easing through expanding fiscal spending while simultaneously tightening monetary policy. Fiscal spending differs from the quantitative easing during the 2008 financial crisis in that it is directly injected into the real economy (Turner, 2023). During the financial crisis, quantitative easing was used to deal with insolvency of investment banks, but fiscal spending during the pandemic and now is used in the real economy. Just as quantitative easing caused post-pandemic inflation, current fiscal spending will also cause inflation. Inflation cannot be prevented unless the dollars released into the real economy is fundamentally reduced. Therefore, if the U.S. government continues its current spending trajectory, prices will likely rise and the economy will face stagflation. If the U.S. economy experiences a gradual slowdown and the benchmark interest rate cannot be lowered accordingly, and it could signal a systemic crisis for the U.S. economy.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my advisor for the valuable insight provided to me on this topic.

Reference

- Agarwal, P. (2022). *Stagflation*. Available at <https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/stagflation/>
- Baldwin, 2022. *The peak globalisation myth: Part 2 – Why the goods trade ratio declined*. CEPR. Available at: <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/peak-globalisation-myth-part-2-why-goods-trade-ratio-declined>.
- Bilali, H and Hassen, T. B (2024). Disrupted harvests: how Ukraine – Russia war influences global food systems – a systematic review. *Policy Studies*, pp.1–26. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2024.2329587>.
- Brunner, K., Cukierman, A. & Meltzer, A. H. (1980). Stagflation, persistent unemployment and the permanence of economic shocks. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, Volume 6, pp. 467-492.
- Canuto, O. (2022). *War in Ukraine and risks of stagflation*. Available at: <https://www.cmacrodev.com/war-in-ukraine-andrisks-of-stagflation/>
- Buchwald, E. (2024). *Fears about stagflation are mounting in the US. It's every central banker's worst nightmare*. CNN Business. CNN. Available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/25/economy/stagflation-us-economy-gdp/index.html>.
- CEPR. (2022). *Today's inflation and the Great Inflation of the 1970s: Similarities and differences*. Available at: <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/todays-inflation-and-great-inflation-1970s-similarities-and-differences>.
- Conerly, B. (2022). *Stagflation: Causes And When It Will Come*. Forbes. Available at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2022/06/28/stagflation-causes-and-when-it-willcome/?sh=5bb5c78d27a5> [Accessed 18 08 2022].
- Congressional Budget Office (2023). *The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2023 to 2033*. Congressional Budget Office. www.cbo.gov. Available at: <https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58946>.

Crow, A. and Sir Robin Niblett (2024). *How US-China relationship is impacting the global trade*. World Economic Forum. Available at: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/01/demystifying-the-idea-of-trade-decoupling/>.

Doctorow, C. (2024). *The unexpected upside of global monopoly capitalism*. Medium. Available at: <https://doctorow.medium.com/https-pluralistic-net-2024-04-10-an-injury-to-one-is-an-injury-to-all-eb00c142aec3>.

Dolan, B. (2022). *Main Characteristics of Capitalist Economies*. Investopedia. Available at: <https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/102914/main-characteristics-capitalist-economies.asp>.

El-Erian, M.A. (2024). *Will the US Economy Drive Global Growth this Year?*. Project Syndicate. Available at: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-economy-soft-landing-likely-but-not-certain-by-mohamed-a-el-erian-2024-02> [Accessed 28 May 2024].

Empower. (2024). *Stagflation: What it is and how to prepare*. Available at: <https://www.empower.com/the-currency/money/stagflation#:~:text=The%20term%20stagflation%20combines%20two>.

Enfu, C. and Global, L. (2021). *Five Characteristics of Neoimperialism*. Monthly Review. Available at: <https://monthlyreview.org/2021/05/01/five-characteristics-of-neoimperialism/>.

Fortune. (2024). *Jerome Powell has had it with the 1970s talk, saying he doesn't see the 'stag' or the '-flation' investors are worried about*. Available at: <https://fortune.com/2024/05/01/jerome-powell-stagflation-1970s-inflation-economic-growth-interest-rates/> [Accessed 18 May 2024].

Foster, J. B. (2002). *Monopoly Capital and the New Globalization*. Monthly Review. Available at: <https://monthlyreview.org/2002/01/01/monopoly-capital-and-the-new-globalization/>.

Gill, I and Kose, M. (2024). *The Global Economy Has Yet to Turn the Corner*. Project Syndicate. Available at: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/global-growth-investment-low-developing-economies-must-change-course-by-indermit-gill-and-m-ayhan-kose-2024-01> [Accessed 28 May 2024].

Halton, C. (2019). *Misery Index Definition*. Investopedia. Available at: <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/miseryindex.asp>.

Harvey, D. (2010). *The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis this Time*. Available at: <https://davidharvey.org/2010/08/the-enigma-of-capital-and-the-crisis-this-time/>.

Hutchinson, M. (2023). *Globalization: Concept, Cause, and Consequences*. Vistatec. Available at: <https://vistatec.com/globalization-concept-cause-and-consequences/>.

IMF. (2024). *The Fiscal and Financial Risks of a High-Debt, Slow-Growth World*. IMF. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/03/28/the-fiscal-and-financial-risks-of-a-high-debt-slow-growth-world>.

IMF (2022). *IMF Annual Report 2022*. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2022/in-focus/covid-19/>.

Kennedy, S. (2024). *U.S.-China Relations in 2024: Managing Competition without Conflict*. Available at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-china-relations-2024-managing-competition-without-conflict>.

Mousina, D. (2024). *The Global Economy in 2024*. Available at: <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/global-economy-2024-diana-mousina-ove1c>.

NBC News. (2024). *Fed chair Jerome Powell: No sign of stagflation in US economy*. Available at: <https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/stagflation-us-economy-what-is-it-are-we-there-rcna150275>.

Office of the Historian (2024). *Milestones: 1937–1945*. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/bretton-woods>.

Ospina, E.O. (2018). *Trade and Globalization. Our World in Data*. Available at: <https://ourworldindata.org/trade-and-globalization>.

The Economist. (2023). *The power and the limits of the American dollar*. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/04/27/the-power-and-the-limits-of-the-american-dollar>.

The Economist. (2021). *Is the world economy going back to the 1970s?*. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/finance-andeconomics/is-the-world-economy-going-back-to-the-1970s/21805260>.

Turner, J. (2023). *Why did the global financial crisis of 2007-09 happen?* Economics Observatory. Available at: <https://www.economicsobservatory.com/why-did-the-global-financial-crisis-of-2007-09-happen>.

Vanham, P. (2019). *A brief history of globalization*. World Economic Forum. Available at: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/how-globalization-4-0-fits-into-the-history-of-globalization/>.

Wessel, D. 2024. *Federal Reserve's Dilemma Is a Nice Problem to Have*. (2024). Bloomberg.com. Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-01-30/federal-reserve-s-dilemma-on-interest-rates-and-the-economy>.

World Bank (2024). *Global Economy Set for Weakest Half-Decade Performance in 30 Years*. World Bank. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/01/09/global-economic-prospects-january-2024-press-release>.

World Bank. (2022). *Stagflation Risk Rises Amid Sharp Slowdown in Growth*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2022/06/07/stagflation-risk-rises-amidsharp-slowdown-in-growth-energy-markets>

Wheeler, C & Papagianni, V. (2024). *The Global Economy in Five Charts*. Available at: <https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/developmenttalk/global-economy-five-charts>.

Wiseman, P. (2024). *Global economy will slow for a third straight year in 2024*. World Bank predicts. Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/global-economy-inflation-china-federal-reserve-recession-bcfa8bc1dc2ac1f8d2680feb86497771>.