

Conviction, Votes, or Nationalism?

How intrinsic and contextual factors drives cultural policymaking

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ABSTRACT

Why do policymakers pursue cultural policies? The existing literature presents several potential answers but no study has surveyed them in a comprehensive way. In this essay, I examine a diverse array of factors behind cultural policymaking. Combining domestic and international perspectives, I identify three major motivations: intrinsic demand, constituency demands and nation-building objectives. I employ a m ix of qualitative and quantitative evidence to explore the hypotheses stemming from these different decision-making dynamics.

Introduction

In this essay, I discuss three motivations for policymakers' cultural policymaking. Intrinsic motivation such as the personal experience and identities of policymakers can lead to different decisions in the field of cultural policies. At the same time, electoral concerns will give raise to constituency motivation, thus influencing the policymaking of cultural policies. Finally, nation-building objectives and the pursuit of a unified and widespread national identity may dictate the content and nature of cultural policy.

The difference in personal background and experience will produce intrinsic motivations in policymaking. This motivation is analyzed and exemplified by policies pursued by leaders of the Taiwan area with different backgrounds and experiences.

The pursuit of winning the election will produce constituency motivation in policymaking as they believe sound cultural policies will raise favorable public opinion, thus supporting their election. This motivation will be investigated by the comparison of the date of establishment of cultural institutions all round the world and the closest election date in the empirical section

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The purpose of increasing national unity and stabilizing the society will lead to nation-building motivation. This motivation will be tested by analyzing mentions of cultural policies in the electoral manifestos of European parties, comparing the extent of their emphasis of the role of state-sponsored culture as well as the importance of the nation.

Across these diverse lines of inquiry, this essay seeks to paint a complex picture and show how politicians are affected by distinct criteria while making cultural policies. Indeed, all three analyses point to the role played by the three main types of motivations.

Review of Literature

Studying the behavior of policymakers with respect to cultural policy and diplomacy requires an understanding of the nature of these policies and their primary objectives. On both points, the existing academic literature analyzes two main dimensions of cultural policy. On one hand, scholars underline the role that cultural policies can play a diplomatic role at the international level, which is understood through the lenses of soft power. On the other hand, a body of research has investigated the domestic aspects of cultural policy, and how it relates to the purposes of nation-building and a unification of ideology, seen as relating to the unification of the ideology of citizens and the formation of a national or regional culture.

On one hand, cultural policies serve to achieve international political goals. In one seminal study, Nye employs the concept of soft power to describe the nation's capacity without relying on economic or military force (Nye, 2004). According to Jervis, national reputation is of greater use than a significant increment of military or economic power (Jervis, 1970). This dynamic therefore explains policymakers' attention to cultural diplomacy, and countries leverage ideological and cultural connections—though medias of policies, cultural products, manifestos and actions of policymakers—with other countries to collaborate and reach foreign policy goals (Nye, 2008).



When cultural diplomacies are made to increase the nation's influence and reputation, the nation itself is the dominating actor. International audiences can only infer the potential meaning of a cultural product already made by others, yielding major determining power to the policymakers (Appadurai, 1996).

Therefore, policymakers have the motivation to wisely issue cultural policies to create a positive national image, and ameliorate the nation's position on the international arena by taking advantage of this persuasive nature of the cultural policies (Eggeling, 2017).

On the other hand, small amounts of papers mention the domestic impact of cultural diplomacy. Specifically, cultural diplomacy can play an important role in nation-building. Nation-building here is the process of creating a united identity a shared national ideology in certain region, or whole country. Citizens are expected to respond to the national image created, or impacted by the reflection of national image which is others' opinions about their culture. Eventually, cultural policies can bring together citizens with different ethnic backgrounds and foster mutual understanding and cohesion among different national subgroups. For example, New Zealand integrated elements of Asian culture in their domestic cultural policy in order to harmonize the relationship between their local citizens and Asian immigrants (Mark, 2008).

To ensure the effect of nation building, policymakers will need to pay attention to how audiences understand the meaning of the cultural products they encounter (Clarke, 2016), whether the meaning that audiences make with cultural products line up with the meaning policymakers seek to project, and whether the activity of agents of cultural diplomacy and cultural practitioners can successfully intervene in that meaning-making (Clarke, 2016). This nation-building motivation is related to different political stance of policymakers and distinct national conditions.

As there is little paper focusing on the statistics of nation-building motivation of the cultural policy, this paper will analyze the correlations and interesting factors between them. Also, as the policymakers themselves, which are determinative in



policymaking process, are always neglected when talking of cultural policies, I will analyze whether the identities of policymakers and their personal pursuit and purpose will affect the cultural policies them make.

Methods

In this part, I first analyze the existing facts and bring up three hypotheses about the motivations of cultural policymaking. Then I discuss the observable process of each hypothesis, what observations will consolidate our hypotheses. Finally, I will set up basic information for my comparisons, statistics and graphs, describing my way of categorizing, testing, and concluding.

Hypothesis I

The policies made will be influenced by the identities of the policymakers.

Firstly, the intrinsic motivation of policymakers making certain policy always comes from their believing that promoting their own culture is important. This motivation is determined by their identity, culture backgrounds, personal experience or own view. At the international level, policymakers are keen on demonstrating the domestic culture to the world. On the other hand, when they see some domestic cultures neglected or disappearing, they will use cultural diplomacy to raise attention to protect these cultures and promote them. This motivation is based on their affection on their domestic culture and an urge to promote and preserve them.

At the national level, we can see a clearer difference in cultural policies made due to the identity of policymakers. Regional leaders may use cultural policies to promote the culture of their provinces and gain nationwide emphasis. National policymakers will also unintentionally prioritize the positive cultural policies towards their hometown.

The major observable factor whether that cultural policy is whether the cultural policies emphasize the importance of the culture of their nation or region. The more they value their own culture, the more intrinsic motivation they will have to



make related cultural policies. Patriotic policy-makers may have a surge in demonstrating the nation's diverse culture and build an excellent national image. Fanatic nationalists will ban foreign cultures from impacting their people. Whether policymakers value their own culture or how much they are patriotic can be observed and measured by analyzing their previous actions, for example: previous policies, decisions, works and projects they have sponsored. Furthermore, their speeches or opinions published on social media can also be observable factors.

The other observable factors that can prove the existence of their intrinsic motivation are their identities. Race, origins, upbringing, factors related to their environment of growth can influence one's action. Cultural policies that can yield benefits or attention to their own identity may account for a relatively large proportion of the total cultural policies.

Hypothesis II

Policy-makers will participate in cultural policies more actively before an election.

Secondly, elected policymakers may make use of cultural policymaking in favor of their political record. In this sense, cultural policies may be used to catch voters' attention and increase their chances to win re-election. Indeed, across countries, there are instances of the political importance of the protection of domestic culture, often perceived as an urgent and necessary response to the growing influence of foreign cultures. In Italy, the opening of Starbucks and KFC have risen worry in local communities over the waning of the traditional gastronomic culture. In response, politicians have taken it up to the government to take measures to curtail the invasion of foreign industries.

The other kind of constituency motivation occurs when the economic or social problem in a country is not well settled in their term and will affect the re-election of the policymaker. In this case, they will transfer the public attention to external policies by cultural diplomacy for example sanctioning foreign culture.



In line with this political reasoning, elected officials may be incentivized to pursue cultural policymaking to demonstrate to the voters their passion and responsibility to the nation's cultural background. In turn, this dynamic is likely to strengthen as new elections draw near.

The constituency motivation is related to the public opinion of citizens because the public opinion affects the result of voting. This motivation can be observed and distinguished by determining whether the cultural policy is electorally competitive. If a policy-maker issue cultural policy which has long been the people's pursuit or expectation before the election, I can tell that they have the constituency motivation to win public favor and votes.

Hypothesis III

More patriotic policymakers will care more about the cultural policies in order to achieve their nation building goal.

Thirdly, policymakers often have domestic goals amounting to nation-building, which is consolidating the country's population into a unitary polity. For such goal, cultural policy can be useful in shaping the country's image and citizens' ideology. Related cultural policies and cultural product can both reinforce national identities and increase national spirit.

When detailing cultural policies, policymakers can choose to sponsor mainstream cultural activities of the country and positively participate in cultural actualization. Nation building purpose can be fulfilled as the social environment will change according to the policy. For example, if a country is demonstrating the uniqueness of their traditional method of making breads, more information related to the traditional method will occur in the society, and many cultural products such as bread made using these techniques will be found more often in the bakeries. As citizens are closely connected to the society, they will unintentionally adapt to this characteristic and take part in promoting it.



In the example of New Zealand's introducing Asian culture to their community for harmonizing the relationship between their local citizens and Asian immigrants, the policymakers conceptualized the region as an inclusive community with Asian immigrants and culture (Mark, 2008). As the governments promoted products containing Asian culture in that region, the local people were gradually accustomed to the existence of Asian culture and accept the identity of the region-community that has Asian immigrants and culture. Therefore, policymakers use effect of cultural policies to assimilate and unite their citizens.

This unity can also be created with the reflection of the foreign ideas. Once foreigners recognize and praise the positive image sent by policymakers, citizens tend to lend more credit to it and keep demonstrating this favored image. It is because foreign opinions are usually more convincing than the domestic politician's claim, and citizens want to maintain others' good impression.

For example, a government intends to demonstrate the 'equality' of their country in cultural diplomacy. If foreigners accept this claim and share their recognition on social medias, domestic citizens will be convinced even they are not satisfied with the country's action of promoting equality. The positive reflection from the foreigners persuades them into accepting such national identity, as they realize through inflection that foreigners by comparison, enjoy less equality. Eventually, citizens will be satisfied with the government and policies.

By analyzing the effect of cultural policies have on nation building that the patriotic policymakers are usually aware of the importance of nation-building and make policies related to improving the power of the nation, I develop the third hypothesis.

The nation-building motivation of the policymakers is observable from the content and target of cultural policies. A policy that increases national confidence is motivated by nation-building motivation. Also, a policy about creating a certain image for the nation's citizens to adapt to is motivated by the nation-building



motivation, which is observable because those policies are made to build citizens' sense of cultural identity confirmation and national pride.

The role of foreigners can be distinguished by whether they reflect the cultural policies back to citizens. Their knowledge of the culture exported and their interest in them can be observable demonstration of their receiving the culture. Their post on social media and their application in life shows how much they use and recreate the culture. If the reflection process does not work in the future, the policymakers can retrospect the influence on foreign audiences and find out which section goes wrong: it is because of the misinterpretation from foreigners that reflects the wrong idea to the domestic audiences, or it is because the reflection doesn't work, which means the citizens do not react to the reflected foreign ideas on their cultures.

How much domestic audiences by the policy aiming at nation-building object can be observed from their change of ideas. If the policies are based on the production process, we can see whether the domestic audiences accept the concept and ideas that the cultural policies conveyed. In the example of using cultural policies to increase national confidence, the cultural and national confidence of the citizens is an observable fact which can be identified through their communication with foreigners, remarks on the internet, and the affections to national cultural. If the policy is based on the reflection process, whether domestic audiences adjust to foreign impressions is an observable factor. Actions, opinions, speeches are all good representations of their adjustment or indifference.

To test **Hypothesis I**, I organized the cultural policies published by Taiwan executive government and information about the identities of their leaders. I need to test that the distinct cultural policies of Taiwan area are associated with the different identities of its leaders. When Taiwan seeks to establish itself as an independent nation from mainland China, policymakers' birthplace—whether mainland or Taiwan—and their personal experience and education seems to be determinative.



I firstly use an illustrative example of a leader of Taiwan area to prove that personal experience will lead to intrinsic motivation in making cultural policies.

I secondly affirm the birth place of the leaders, and categorize them into two groups. The first group, consisting of Chiang Kai-shek, Yen Chai-kan, Chiang Ching-kuo, and Ma Ying-jeou, who were born in mainland or Hong Kong, hold a mild and positive attitude towards Chinese culture, in the realm of entertainment and education. The KMT leaders also promoted a (re) nationalization and the 'cultural renaissance movement', on language, media, entertainment and economy, and raise cultural consciousness by involving citizens into Chinese culture and habits (Chun, 1994).

The second group, consisting of Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Tsai Ing-wen, who were born in Taiwan area, define Chinese culture of mainland as foreign. They made cultural policy aiming to separate Taiwan culture with that of the mainland, and promoted the localization of Taiwan culture and Taiwan's subjective consciousness and ideology. Their cultural policies included editing the history textbook by deleting Chinese emperors, distorting the disputes and conflicts of the wars happened in China, misinterpreting the history of Mazu culture and Chinese traditional deity, limiting the use of mandarin and showing foreigners with their Taiwan-centered culture and traditions. Then I compare the policies made by leaders of Taiwan area with different birth place—either in mainland or Taiwan—and found difference in their cultural and educational policies.

To verify **Hypothesis II**, I randomly select 40 national cultural institutions and compare the date of their establishment and the closest national election date. If a Cultural Academy is established within a year to the new election, or within the last quarter of the term of service, I refer to these two actions as relevant, thus leading to the relevance of the constituency motivation and the cultural policymaking action. Then I will use an example to illustrate the phenomenon in the hypothesis.

To verify Hypothesis III, I combine data with graphs to show the relationship between variables.



I used the data from the manifesto project which code coalition manifestos of all parties from 56 countries that have won seat in national elections to the lower house from 1920 to 2018. For each party, the manifesto project provides data on the number of times each party mentions a specific topic. In this codebook, the parties are already organized in categories, and their appeals to patriotism and nationalism are already measured and saved as parameters per601. The average position on private funding for cultural policy is saved as per 5021. The topics analyzed to verify this hypothesis are above mentions of culture policies and private fundings on culture policies. I then identify correlations between party type and their action on culture policies to figure whether nation-building intention will lead to more motivations in drafting culture policies.

I first created a scatterplot, correlating the number of mentions of specific topics using ordinary least-squares linear regression. Therefore, each point represents a specific party-year platform with the coordinates representing the number of mentions of the two topics. Both models I did have country and year fixed effects, which means, simplifying, that the model compares platforms within each year and country. The line is obtained with the regression coefficient and the intercept values. The shaded area around the line is calculated with the standard errors from the regression model.

The second type of graph is much simpler and just compares the average mention of the topic across party typologies. Therefore, for each party family (ex: ethnic parties), I calculated the average number of mentions of the specific topic, and then the dot in the graph represents, on the y-axis, that mean cultural diplomacy, funding, or goals in their manifestos, to determine their opinion and choices towards cultural policies.

All models I did have country and year fixed effects, which means, simplifying, that the model compares platforms within each year and country.

Results



In **Hypothesis I**, I first bring this example. The former leader of Taiwan area, Lee Teng-hui, whose mother is Japanese, had his personal experience of going to Japan and received university education in Kyoto Imperial University (Tsai, 2005). Before his being the leader of Taiwan area, many Japanese culture transmission was prohibited by the government. During the period of his being the leader, he deregulated Japanese culture and Japanese Tv shows and music began to appear at higher frequency on medias. Also, when editing the new version of textbooks, the Lee Teng-hui government embellished the Japan's behavior and image in World War II, presenting its political and cultural inclination to the country he once resided in. These actions can show how his identity bring him intrinsic motivation that influenced his decision making.

By analyzing the difference in the two groups consisting of policymakers of different identities, I find distinct actions in making cultural policies. Due to the worsening relationship and the raising detestation in citizens between mainland and Taiwan area, policymakers whose birth place is Taiwan area tend to eliminate the influence of Chinese culture using diverse cultural policies. Chen Shui-Bian declared in his manifesto in August 2002 the independence of Taiwan, and downplayed Taiwan's cultural and historical links to China (Hickey & Li, 2002). Lee Teng-hui managed the editing of textbook <Knowing Taiwan> on culture, history and geography, separating Taiwan cultural with Chinese culture. Tsai Ingwen, also contrasted the (re)nationalization cultural policy carried out by KMT, and promoted further cultural policies of Taiwanization (Shih, 2021). She edited the <Taiwan Language Act>, marginalized the role of Chinese and published the cancellation of Chinese festivals and commemoration days.

In **Hypothesis II**, after analyzing the time of the establishment of all the culture institutes established by the government and the date of election of the leader of the country, I find that about 48% of the institutes were established within a year of the new election, or within the last quarter of the term of service. Normally, if the cultural institutes are not carried out by electoral purposes, the possibility of the cultural institutes established within a year to the new election, or within the last quarter of the term of service is about 15% to 25%, when the average term of service of the country leader is about 4 to 6 years.

The specific example will be the establishment of institute Français. French's Cultural Diplomacy mainly uses the Institut Français, whose predecessor is the Culturesfrance. Interestingly, I can see that the important steps to carry out this program were made shortly before the election. In 2006, they combined two associations— The Ministry of Culture and Communication and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs— to form a new start of the French's cultural diplomacy named Culturesfrance Then, the Alliance Française was reorganized in 2007, the election year. A few years later the Culturesfrance was replaced by the Institut Français with multi-goals in promoting French culture, and it mainly focuses on the cultural interactions in the information era. This job is done in 2011, while the election year is in 2012.

In Hypothesis III,

This first scatter plot (graph 1) analyzes whether patriotic policymakers will stress the value of cultural policies, as patriotic policymakers emphasize nation-building and the unity of citizens.





FIG 1

On the X-axis, I use the Patriotism as parameter. On the Y-axis, I collect the mentions in the manifesto of the cultural policy. Therefore, each point represents a specific party-year platform with the coordinates representing the number of mentions of the two topics. The line is obtained with the regression coefficient and the intercept values. The shaded area around the line is calculated with the standard errors from the regression model.


When I relate patriotism to the extent of support for established national ideas, general appeals to the pride of citizenship, patriotism, and suspension of some freedoms to protect the state against subversion, I find that the more the policymakers accord with the characteristics of patriotism, the less frequent they will bring up topics related to cultural policies in their manifesto.



In **graph 2**, private and public findings are defined as private or public provisions due to economic constraints. The difference between public and private funding here is that with more percentage of public funding, the project and the policies are more likely to be supervised by the government or involves the national ideology or purpose and vice versa.


After analyzing the data of the extent of patriotism and the private funding for cultural diplomacy, I find that a weak positive correlation between them which cannot be powerful evidence for our hypothesis.

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Moving on to this new type of graph, the ethno-regional party is defined as party consisting of politicians representing certain ethnicity or region and hold a positive attitude towards the development of their ethnicity or their region. The nationalist party here is defined as party whose members hold a positive attitude toward the actions of the central government and work toward the goal of the development of an identical national image and ideology.

In the **graph3**, the average position on private funding on cultural policy represents the level of government control of the cultural policies. In the graph, I can see that the ethno-regional party has a very high position (1#) of private funding in cultural policies and the nationalistic party has a very low position (9#) of private funding.



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In this **graph 4**, I see a flat line with a tendency of decline that represents the relationship between soft power and cultural policies. The politicians mention more of the soft power mention less about the cultural policies.

Discussion

The result of **Hypothesis I** shows that detestation caused by different identity in two groups will intrinsically motivate policymakers' behavior to issue policies that benefit the culture of their birth place or living place. Thus, policymakers are influenced by their identities will making cultural policies, and will intrinsically devote to political actions that benefit their own identity.

The statistical differences in **Hypothesis II** show an apparent increase in the cultural policies made when the date of the election is close, indicating that the need for votes and recognition by citizens of promoting national culture is one motivation for policymakers setting up national cultural institutes overseas during a short period before election.

In the **graph 1 of the Hypothesis III,** the more the policymakers accord with the characteristics of patriotism, the less frequent they will bring up topics related to cultural policies in their manifesto. This can be explained by the priority level of policies ranked by those patriotic policymakers. Many patriots regard the hard power and the economic status of the nation as the most determinative factor of the nation's power and try every method to boost the economy or increase stockpiles of weapons. In this scenario, the cultural diplomacy related to soft power is considered less important especially when the country's hard power is not strong enough. Therefore, the more patriotic the policymakers are, the less they are likely to mention cultural policies.

In **graph II**, I hypothesized at first that more patriotic policymakers are more likely to want more public funding and less private funding for their policyimplementation because they are thought to believe in the government and want to keep pace with the major policies of the government. As the resulted statistic is not significant, I cannot prove that more patriotic want less private funding. It can be

explained that a patriotic policymaker doesn't necessarily care about cultural diplomacy and they will possibly apply their patriotism in the policymaking in other fields.

In **graph III**, I can see from the result that the ethno-regional party wants little government control over the policymaking of cultural policies. Through this I can see the threat and pressure the government control has on ethno-regional parties. Parties established by certain ethnic groups or people in the same region want to have their own culture and regional traditions be emphasized and they think that government will try to homogenize the cultures and reduce the influence of single culture and traditions.

On the contrary, nationalist parties pursue more about the integrity of the country and the united ideology. They want to present the country to the rest of the world as an entirety and lessen the prominence of a single culture.

In **graph IV**, the politicians mention more of the soft power mention less about the cultural policies. Though culture is an aspect of the soft power, I can understand from the graph that cultural policies are not the first choice of the politician to develop soft power, since cultural diplomacy need a slow and indefinite process to produce an effect.

Conclusion and Implications

I conclude that the culture policies are affected by the intrinsic motivation of policymakers such as identities, living experience and attachments though the comparison study of leaders of Taiwan. Also, the policymakers use cultural policies to add competitiveness to their election by protecting and promoting the voters' culture.

Reviewing **graph**, **I**, **II**, **III**, **IV** in **Hypothesis III** above, we know that patriotic policymakers do not prefer using cultural policies for nation-building and cultural policies are not the choice for politicians to build soft power. It may due to the fact that cultural policy is time-consuming and will bring inconspicuous outcome. On



the contrary, different party react differently to the cultural policies. The ethnoregional party want a large percentage of private funding in cultural policies and the nationalist party act conversely. It is because ethno-regional party afraid that the central government will try to alienize their diverse culture and present a unified ethnic image to the world using cultural policies. And nationalist party want their country to have a united national image. The different actions of different party demonstrate that their different stance in nation-building affect their decision in making cultural policies.

Using this paper, we can see the motivations of policymakers from a more diverse way, combining their election date, personal information, and nation-building stance. We no longer only focus on their purpose of preserving cultural and building international reputation. Policymaking is a complicated process that operate upon multiple factors, and cultural policies, which contribute to soft power, should be carefully made with diverse motivation.

Future Research

There are also things remain to be discussed. As different people interpret cultural differently, I have to ensure the effect of cultural policies and avoid misinterpretation. As the motivation result from a combination of multi-factors, I need to calculate proportion of each factor and discuss why the importance of different factors varies with time or countries.

For **Hypothesis I**, more regions other than Taiwan should also be involved. Our next step is to compare the delegates of the U.S House of Representatives whose hometown are different states, and analyze whether their proposals are related to the culture of their own state. I need wider range of study and analysis to make out more related problems in order to comprehend the motivations for making cultural policies and their latent effect. More intrinsic motivation, other than identities, such as previous policies and post on social media should be analyzed. For **Hypothesis II**, more cultural policies other than cultural institutes should be discussed, for example folk culture preservation, international cultural exchange programs and movies related to culture. More elections, in different executive department should be taken into account. For **Hypothesis III**, as there are two graphs that are relatively statistically insignificant, I need to find explanation to this, and test the explanation. I can also, add some other parameters for restriction so that the statistic can be more illustrative.



Limitations

In **Hypothesis I**, I analyze the intrinsic motivation of identity and personal experience. However, in the case I bring about Taiwan, there are other confounding variables that I didn't exclude.

Taiwan seeks to establish itself as an independent nation from mainland China, and therefore cultural policy is very important for this goal. However, this factor remains the same for all these leaders, whereas the identities of the leaders change. As such, I could infer that the changes in cultural policies may be associated with the changing identity of leaders, as opposed to the constant nation-building objective. Nevertheless, this is still a confounding variable that I can hardly identify.

Also, the earlier leaders who grew up when Taiwan wasn't seeking independence are more favorable for Chinese culture, and recent leaders want to exclude them. I need to consider the historical influence in the policymaking process, besides the identities and intrinsic motivations. In **Hypothesis II**, the electoral motivation, there is possibility that policymakers just make a lot of policies of all categories to benefit the voters, some cultural policies included. In this case, cultural policies are not their main focus to attract the voters, and they are not considering making more cultural policies to win voters. What's more, I only talk about the president elections, and this result cannot be applied to other leaders of some departments. So, I will collect data of policymakers in other departments and office to find relevance between the cultural policymaking and the election date. In **Hypothesis III**, the manifesto can demonstrate the policymakers' claim but not actions. Some parties use claims to attract followers but never apply the cultural policies mentioned in the manifesto. I should further analyze relationship between nation-building motivation and policies already made.

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